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Since the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union (EU) operates under 
three key pillars.  The second pillar, known as the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), introduced the need among Member States to develop a common 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  Aimed at providing police and 
military capabilities to the CFSP, this idea represented a new important element 
in the European integration progress.  ESDP was launched formally in June 
1999, establishing ESDP’s mission roots on what it is known as the three 
“Petersberg Tasks,” (1) Humanitarian and Evacuation Missions, (2) Peace 
Keeping Missions, and (3) Combat Missions for Crisis Management.  The aim of 
EU was to upgrade its role and influence in the international arena, with no 
intention of overcoming NATO's role and capabilities in the field of collective 
defense. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the perspectives for the 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy and to stress the 
need to consider Electronic Warfare a critical asset in the military and 
technological capability options. The need for common operational concepts, 
doctrines and training, especially in the field of EW, becomes a necessity as Joint 
EU Armed Forces report active and ready to manage regional and international 
crisis.  However, the study of ESDP’s current status shows that EW, an important 
military component, has been addressed but not emphasized properly. In order 
to demonstrate EW’s “weight”, an imaginary scenario, under the name “Save 
Atlantia 2008”, has been created in which an advance software program, (i.e., 
IMOM model), simulates EW effects. The Improved Many-on-Many (IMOM) 
computer software, presently used by the U.S. Air Force to model the Electronic 
Order of Battle (EOB), will be used to model the Radar and Tactical Jamming 
System and conclusions will be based on the theoretical expected jamming 
effectiveness of the Joint European Air Force against several radar systems in 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Europe faced a new era after the Second World War (WWII). The need, 
among Europeans, to establish a common economic, social and military path 
became visible during the early 1950s.  Fifty three years later, the Maastricht 
Treaty, renamed the European Community (EC), originally formed in 1958, to 
European Union (EU) and shaped what is known as EU’s three pillars.  The first 
pillar, European Community, combined all the existing treaties and supported the 
European Monetary Union1. The second pillar, Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), promoted cooperation among member states in foreign policy 
affairs and the third pillar, Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, dealt with 
common European views relative to these issues2.  However, the second pillar 
introduced also the need to develop a common European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP).  Aimed at providing police and military capabilities to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), this idea represented a new 
element in the European integration process. 
The Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999, triggered by 
external challenges such as the war in Kosovo, decided to develop further the 
scope of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and launched the 
European Security and Defense policy (ESDP) establishing ESDP’s mission 
roots on what is known as the three “Petersberg Tasks”, (1) humanitarian and 
evacuation missions, (2) peace keeping missions, and (3) combat missions for 
crisis management (including disarmament missions and missions to restore 
peace)3. The European Council has agreed that “the Union must have the 
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means 
                                            
1 Maartje Rutten, “From Nice to Laeken European Defense: Core Documents,” Chaillot Paper 
No. 51, WEU Institute for Security Studies, April 2002, http://www.iss-eu-org/chaillot/chai51e.pdf, 
accessed 15 March 2004. 
2 Ibid. 
3 ESDP Policy, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/, accessed 16 
February 2004. 
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to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”4. Thus, in December 
1999, the Helsinki European Council set the Headline Goals 2003 (HG) in terms 
of military capabilities and created the European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).  
For the Union this meant to be able, by the year 2003, to deploy within 60 
days, and sustain for at least one year, up to 60,000 persons (or up to 15 
brigades) capable of executing the full range of Petersberg Tasks5. It must be 
emphasized that the achievement of these goals did not involve the 
establishment of a European army. The deployment of national troops was to be 
based on autonomous decisions taken by Member States.  
The Union defined arrangements for the possible participation of third 
countries (European Member States of NATO not part of the Union, third 
countries and other candidate countries for accession to the Union) and other 
potential partners in EU military crisis management. In addition, permanent 
arrangements had been agreed for EU-NATO consultation and cooperation. 
Meetings between the Union and NATO were to be held on a regular basis in 
certain specific fields with a view to enabling the Union, where necessary, to 
launch operations using NATO assets and capabilities (notably planning 
capabilities and command options).  
The aim of all this work was that the EU should become rapidly 
operational.  The EU also decided to develop the civilian aspects of crisis 
management in several priority areas defined by the Feira European Council 
(June 2000): police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian 
administration and civil protection6. Discussions have continued on the 
implementation of the Petersberg Tasks.  These discussions have been 
transformed into policies and reflected “the Union's consistent approach to 
                                            
4 Available at http://www.europa.eu.int , accessed 27 March 2004. 
5 Jean-Yves Haine, ESDP: An Overview, European Union, Institute for Security Studies, 
available at http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf, accessed 12 March 2004. 
6 Available at http://www.europa.eu.int, accessed 27 March 2004. 
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support missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security based on UN principles”7.  This group of 
measures is today called the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). 
One of the very first steps the Union took since the launch of ESDP was to 
develop military and political structures that would improve EU’s operational and 
military capabilities based on contributions by its Member States.  The motivation 
was high, and with few exceptions, the first contribution in terms of human 
resources and infantry was a reality.  As expected, a number of shortfalls were 
identified and EU members decided to create a European Capability Action Plan, 
(ECAP), in order to identify capable solutions.  ECAP panels until now have 
provided useful feedback.  Furthermore, EU’s performance on missions launched 
under ESDP status offer a better view of the capabilities that need to be 
improved.  In Brussels on 17-18 June 2004, the 25 EU member states approved 
the document entitled Headline Goals 2010 and have been committed to be able 
to respond to crises throughout the world by 20108.   
On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the 
decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the 
Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of 
forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their 
mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision 
to launch the operation9.  
The new Headline Goals include the main parameters for further 
development of EU’s military capabilities, and the creation of the Battlegroups as 
a complement force to EU’s Rapid Reaction Force. The future will provide many 
military challenges for the European Forces.  Therefore, among many areas to 
consider, Electronic Warfare (EW) is a key aspect, if EU’s military autonomy is to 
be implemented.  This is one of the critical military capabilities that was missing 
                                            
7 Martin Ortega, Petersburg Tasks and Missions of the Europeans Forces, available at, 
http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf, accessed 10 April 2004. 
8 Informal meeting of Defense Ministers, Brussels 5-6 April 2004, available at 
http://ue.eu.int/solana, accessed 21 May 2004 
9 ESDP Council Conclusions, 2582nd Council Meeting, External Relations, Brussels, 17 May 
2004.  
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from the European inventories during the Kosovo campaign, making them 
depend almost completely on U.S. capabilities. This is also one area where 
European co-operation could make a difference. 
EW is an important capability that can advance desired military, 
diplomatic, and economic objectives or, conversely, impeded 
undesirable ones. In a military application, EW provides the means 
to counter, in all battle phases, hostile actions that involve the 
electromagnetic (EM) spectrum- from the beginning when enemy 
forces are mobilized for an attack, through to the final 
engagement10.   
B.  PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the perspectives for the 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy and to stress the 
need to consider Electronic Warfare as a critical asset in the military and 
technological capability options of the ESDP. The study concludes with an 
evaluation of these ideas and recommendations for the development of ESDP.    
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis will review key authors and articles in the literature, looking for 
the following questions: 
• What are the role and the plans of ESDP in the European Union? Is 
the EU committed to these plans? 
• What are ESDP’s current status and issues?  
• What are the Petersberg Tasks and the Headline Goals? 
• What are the perspectives for the development of the ESDP?  
• What are the operational and technical capabilities necessary for 
the implementation of Petersberg Tasks? What capabilities will the 
Europeans develop and improve and in what time frame? 
• How Electronic Warfare contributes to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the ESDP and the European Rapid Reaction Force? 
As demonstrated in Kosovo, high intensity conflict requires EW 
assets. Do European nations on the whole posses the political will 
to support the development of a power projection force at this time?  
                                            
10 Anthony E. Spezio, Electronic Warfare Systems, IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory 
and Techniques, Vol. 50, No. 3, March 2002, p. 633. 
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• What would be the effectiveness of the EU aircraft stand-off 
jamming against future threats and early warning radars during high 
intensity conflict operations? 
• What is the relation between EW/ESDP and NATO/U.S.? How 
does EU’s effort to develop an autonomous defense mechanism 
affect the transatlantic relationship? 
The answers to these questions offer the opportunity to explore the main 
idea behind ESDP’s overall existence and behavior.  
D.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The topic of ESDP, combined with the issue of EW, is worthy of a 
dissertation, and this thesis attempts to examine and analyze the current 
common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) status with the objective 
(1) to examine the short, mid and long term options for the development of 
ESDP, (2) define the operational and technical capabilities necessary for 
implementation of the Petersberg Tasks, (3) explore the current status of ESDP 
by focusing on Electronic Warfare (EW) as an option that contributes to the 
efficiency of the ESDP and the European Armed forces, (4) examine the future 
relations of EW and ESDP with NATO and the United States, (5) use of the 
IMOM model for wargaming an EU RRF unilateral course of action against an 
hypothetic enemy and (6) make recommendations in order for the member states 
of the European Union to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management 
operations, with the intention of strengthening the Union's role and influence in 
international politics, and at the same time, with no intention of overcoming 
NATO's and the U.S.’s role and capabilities in the field of collective defense. This 
research will be based on a systematic study of related books, articles and 
reports. The scope will not include (a) a detailed plan for the implementation of 
military capability options in the ESDP (b) a detailed analysis required for the 
implementation of EW in the ESDP and (c) a detailed evaluation of the current 
relation between EW/ESDP and NATO/U.S.. Finally, as a Major of the Hellenic 
Republic, an ally of the United States and as a citizen of the European Union, the 
author strongly believes that ESDP is a topic that will dominate European military 
affairs and EW plays a significant role in ESDP’s performance.  
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E.  METHODOLOGY 
The topic of ESDP, combined with the issues of the EW, is vast and 
difficult to summarize in one thesis. The thesis starts with a description of the 
main EU Treaties and continues with an analysis of ESDP’s current and future 
prospects. Through the study of ESDP’s current status, it is evident that an 
important military component, i.e., EW, has been addressed but not emphasized.  
In order to demonstrate EW’s “weight”, an imaginary scenario, under the name 
“Save Atlantia 2008”, has been created in which computer software simulates 
EW effects, i.e., the IMOM model.  The IMOM Model clearly illustrates EW’s 
power in the Air Force.  Finally, the necessary recommendations and conclusions 
are made at the conclusion of this thesis based on the existing material. 
F.   ORGANIZATION OF STUDY  
The thesis is organized into eight chapters.  
• Chapter I begins with a brief introduction, followed by the purpose 
and research questions, the scope and limitations, methodology, 
the organization of this study, and finally the findings.  
• Chapter II defines ESDP and gives a brief historical overview of the 
development of the European Union, the formation of CSFP and 
ESDP in the European Union, and finally the Petersberg Tasks.  
• Chapter III examines EU efforts, under the ESDP status, to develop 
the whole spectrum of operational and military capabilities 
necessary to implement the Petersberg Tasks and provides useful 
information about EU’s recent tasks and deployments. It also 
identifies EW as a missing element that needs to be addressed 
more thoroughly. 
• Chapter IV examines EW as an option that contributes to the 
operational effectiveness and efficiency of ESDP and the European 
forces. Additionally, through references to the several Electronic 
Warfare definitions, this study provides a necessary background on 
the operational functions of EW. In addition, there is a brief 
introduction for the Improved Many on Many (IMOM) model. The 
IMOM will be used to model the radar and Tactical Jamming 
System and conclusions will be based on the theoretical expected 
jamming effectiveness of the Joint European Air Force against 
several radar systems in an imaginary scenario.  
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• Chapter V examines an imaginary scenario “Save Atlantia 2008” 
and shows how modern EW tools, such as those used in the IMOM 
Model, provide a competitive advantage on the battlefield.   
• Chapter VI focuses on the debate over the ideal level of interaction 
and cooperation between Europe and the United States on security 
issues in the 21st century.  
• Chapter VII provides conclusions and recommendations and 
discusses implications for the future of the ESDP and the European 
armed forces. 
G. FINDINGS      
The European Union is keener than ever to play a significant role in the 
global arena and unanimously and autonomously address security threats. 
However, due to military deficiencies, European forces do not have the 
momentum to address effectively high intensity conflicts without NATO’s 
assistance.  EW is a key asset that if explored and developed properly, will 
strengthen not only EU’s military autonomy and but also NATO’s overall 
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II.  HISTORIC BACKGROUND 
The end of WWII marked a new era for Europe.  Leading European 
countries felt the need to secure peace and lessen the threats created in the past 
by uncontrolled nationalism and xenophobia.  One of the most enthusiastic 
supporters of the idea of the European unity was Winston Churchill.  He stated in 
1946: 
The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to 
make the material strength of a single state less important. The 
fighting has stopped. But the dangers have not stopped. If we are 
to form a United States of Europe or whatever name it may take, 
we must begin now.11 
At this point in time, the idea of a united Europe found the President of the 
United States in agreement.  President Eisenhower stated in 1951:  
I believe in it this much, when I came over here. I disliked the whole 
idea of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without it. 
However, I have decided that it offers another chance for bringing 
another link here, so I made up my mind to go into the thing with 
both feet. So I am going to try to help, and I realize that a lot of my 
professionals’ associates are going to think I am crazy. But I tell 
you that joining Europe together is the key to the whole question.12   
A.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The first step began in May 1950 when the French foreign minister, Robert 
Schuman, proposed a plan for the creation of an authority to control the 
production of coal and steel in West Germany and France. This plan was called 
the Schuman Plan13. Definitely, it was for this reason that those desired a federal 
state of Europe, hoped that this plan would lead to an expansion of integration 
                                            
11 Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community, A History, St. Martin Press, New 
York, 1980, p. 14. 
12 Ibid., p. 119. 
13 The real aim of this plan was to make another war between Germany and France 
impossible by integrating an important element in a country’s ability to wage war: heavy industry. 
Schuman’s long-term objective was to achieve reconciliation between Germany and France and 
increasing European integration, with the ultimate goal of a European federation. Schuman is 
considered one of the founding fathers of European integration. Available at, http://www.dadalos-
europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
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into other areas of cooperation. In June 1950, a conference was called to 
examine this proposal, and in April 1951, the “Treaty of Paris” was signed in 
France by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg 
and Holland.  The countries agreed to bring their coal and steel industries 
together into a single market and created the European Coal and Steel 
Community14 (ECSC). 
In 1958, the six members of ECSC signed the Treaty of Rome in Rome 
that created the European Economic Community15 (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC).  The treaty became active on 1 January 
1958.  The main goals of the EEC, known as the Common Market, were the 
development of common agricultural, transport, competition and economic 
policies among members.  EAEC, also known as EURATOM, aimed to promote 
nuclear R&D, (Research and Development) for civilian use and to develop 
extensive commercial outlets for nuclear fuel and energy16.   
During the period between the Treaty of Rome and the first significant 
amendment of this treaty, called the Single European Act17 (SEA), the EEC 
welcomed six more members.  Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined 
the EEC in 1973.  Greece joined in 1981 and Spain and Portugal joined the EEC 
in 1986. By 1986, the number of EEC members doubled.  In addition, during this 
phase, another international organization was formed in 1973, the Organization 
                                            
14 History of EU, Stage 1, p. 22, available at http://www.dadalos-europe.org. accessed 29 March 
2004. 
15 The EEC had as its aim the eventual economic union of its member nations, ultimately 
leading to political union. It worked for the free movement of labor and capital, the abolition of 
trusts and cartels, and the development of joint and reciprocal policies on labor, social welfare, 
agriculture, transport, and foreign trade. Source available at http://www.dadalos-europe.org, 
accessed 29 March 2004 
16 History of EU, Stage 2, p. 24, available at http://www.dadalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 
2004. 
17 The Single European Act (SEA), signed in Luxembourg and the Hague. The treaty 
became effective on 1 July 1987. The goal of this treaty was to obtain an internal market. SEA 
expanded EU’s scope in several areas (research and technology, environment), as well as 
improving decision-making procedures. Source available at http://www.dadalos-europe.org, 
accessed 29 March 2004. 
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for Security and Co-operation in Europe18 (OSCE), which became the largest 
regional security organization in the world with 55 progressively participating 
countries from Europe, Central Asia and North America.  
The second largest reform, after SEA, was the Treaty of Maastricht, also 
known as the Treaty on European Union, which came into force at the end of 
1993.  If the internal market project formed the focal point of the SEA, it was the 
economic and monetary union that was the cornerstone of the Treaty of 
Maastricht. As expected, in Maastricht, it was decided to move towards an 
economic and monetary union (EMU) following an “irreversible?  three-phase 
program”19. Following the Werner Plan (1970) and the European Monetary 
System or EMS (1979), this program represented the third attempt at achieving 
EMU, which finally went into effect on 1 January 1999. The Maastricht Treaty 
renamed the European Community to the European Union by forming what is 
known as the three pillars of the EU: the supranational20 European Community 
(EC) pillar along with the two intergovernmental pillars; the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs, (Shown in Figure 2.1).  
 
                                            
18 OSCE is still active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation. 
19 Source available at http://www.dadalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
20 Supranational structures represent the surrendering of sovereign rights. The first 
supranational European organization was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
available at http://www.dadalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
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Figure 2.1. The Three Pillars of the EU21 
 
The EC Pillar is the generic term for three different European 
communities:  
• European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris), 
• European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic 
Community (Treaty of Rome),  
• The Treaty of Maastricht, to which several important amendments 
and changes have been made22. 
It is the most important and most comprehensive pillar.  The Treaty of 
Amsterdam strengthened its powers in 1997, and as did the Treaty of Nice in 
2001 as well. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) formed the "second 
pillar" and built upon the intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy. The 
Maastricht Treaty replaced the "European Political Cooperation"23 (EPC) with the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In addition, the Treaty formulated 
                                            
21 Figure available at, http://www.dadalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
22 Ibid. 
23 European political cooperation (EPC) was introduced informally in 1970 and formalized by 
the Single European Act (SEA) and in effect since 1987. The object is consultations between the 
Member States in foreign policy matters. The Member States have regard for the views of the 
European Parliament, and wherever possible, take common positions in international 
organizations. EPC was superseded by the common foreign and security policy. Available at, 
http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
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the goal of eventually introducing a common defense policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defense system. As explained in the following pages, part of 
the CSFP is the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which has been 
created to improve the Union’s police and military capabilities24. 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs formed the "third pillar". It 
represents an agreement by EU member states to cooperate on justice and 
home affairs and was also made outside of the treaty establishing the European 
Community25.  
The EU progressed significantly since the Treaty of Rome into a 
multifunction Union and achieved high levels of integration. Moreover, Finland, 
Austria and Sweden, joined the EU in 1995, and a further expansion of EU 
membership to 15 member countries were accomplished. The intent was to 
terminate the process of reform in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which, in turn, 
represented the third largest treaty revision after the SEA and the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and went into effect on 
1 May 1999. From a legal point of view, the Amsterdam Treaty amended certain 
provisions of the EU Treaty.  Its purpose was not to replace other treaties but to 
extend them26.   
However, it soon became obvious that the Treaty of Amsterdam failed in 
one of its main objectives, which was to prepare the EU for enlargement against 
ongoing accession negotiations with 12 other nations (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, the Czech 
                                            
24 Maartje Rutten, “From Nice to Laeken European Defence: Core Documents,” Chaillot 
Paper No. 51, WEU Institute for Security Studies, April 2002, available at, http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai51e.pdf, accessed 15 March 2004. 
25 Available at, http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
26 Ibid. 
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Republic, Hungary and Cyprus27). Consequently, the next treaty, The Treaty of 
Nice, represented the fourth largest amendment to the Treaty of Rome after the 
Single European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(refer to Figure 2.2).  
Given that the Treaty of Amsterdam had not fulfilled its purpose, the 
government conference in 2000, and the subsequent meeting of the Council of 
Europe in Nice (December 2000), were once again concerned with undertaking 
the issue of institutional reforms faced with enlargement. The EU members at 
Nice tried to secure that the Union could still function with almost twice the 
members (27 rather 15). The following five issues were at the centre of 
negotiations: the size and composition of the Commission; the weighting of votes 
in the Council; the possibility of expanding the scope of decisions taken using 
qualified majority voting; other questions arising from the remnants of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam; and closer cooperation28.   
Overall, the structure of the European Union has been based on treaties 
summarized in the following Figure 2.2 and the three pillars presented in Figure 
2.1. Today, and since 1 May 2004, the EU has 25 country members29. In 
addition, the second pillar along with the treaties that led to a common European 
foreign policy will be presented in the following paragraphs.    
 
                                            
27 The applications of the countries were given on December 1997. Accession negotiations 
officially began with these countries on February 2000 in Brussels. Turkey was also given 
candidate status, even if it remains unclear as to if and when negotiations will begin. Also taking 
into account the other five southern European countries (Albania, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Croatia 
and FYROM), to which the promise of EU membership has been held out within the scope of the 
Stability Pact, along with Norway and Switzerland, whose membership attempts are currently on 
hold, the total is 35 nations! Available at http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004 
28 Available at http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
29 Since 1 May 2004, the EU has 25 countries members: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nederland, Austria, Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden, United Kingdom. The new EU members are:  Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus, and the candidates members are: 
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey. Available at http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
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B.  THE “SECOND PILLAR” AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) 
The need among country members to obtain a common foreign security 
policy became a necessity at an early stage.  The fundamental objective was to 
become a noteworthy player in the international arena.  Therefore, the idea of a 
common European foreign and defense policy extends back to 1952 when the 
six members of ECSC, including France and Germany, signed an agreement to 
establish a Common European Defense Community (EDC).  The plan, known as 
the Pleven Plan, was extremely progressive as it even proposed that a joint 
European army under a joint command could replace national armies31.  As 
expected, the countries were not mature enough to accept this plan.  It was one 
                                            
30 Figured available at, http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm, accessed 29 March 
2004. 
31 EU Glossary, p. 18, available at http://www.dadalos-europe.org/int/materialien/glossar.htm, 
accessed 29 March 2004. 
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thing for traditional enemies such as France and Germany to cooperate in trade 
and quite another to share a common army almost 10 years after Germany’s 
invasion of France and WWII.  Naturally, in 1954, the French Parliament 
disproved the idea and the whole plan collapsed32.      
In the early 1960s, the Fouchet Plans33 envisioned a common foreign and 
defense policy.  Unfortunately, the member countries could not find a common 
platform of cooperation and negotiations struggled.  The 'Davignon Report'34, in 
1970, suggested possible ways of moving forward toward a common foreign 
status.  This became a starting point for the European Political Cooperation35 
(EPC).  The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the Revolution in Iran made clear 
that the European Community needed to have a cohesive foreign policy in the 
international scene. It took 17 years to make EPC an official tool of the European 
Community.  Finally, the amendment of Luxembourg and the Hague in 1987 
included EPC in the Single European Act (SEA)36. 
During the 1990’s, it became clear that Europe had entered a new era.  
The end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the former republic of Yugoslavia had been foreign affair issues that 
effected the EC in more than one aspect.  The member countries felt the need to 
upgrade EPC by forming CFSP37, the second pillar in the structure of the 
European Union (refer to Figure 1).  Article 11 appoints CFSP’s key principles: 
• to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the 
Union;  
• to strengthen the security of the Union;  
                                            
32 Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community, A History, St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1980, p. 23. 
33 “The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Introduction,” available at 
europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm, accessed 29 March 2004. 
34 EU Glossary, p. 20, Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 The Treaty on the European Union, known as Treaty of Maastricht, introduced Title V and 
replaced EPC with CFSP. EU Glossary p. 7, Ibid. 
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• to preserve peace and strengthen international security;  
• to promote international cooperation;  
• to develop democracy and the rule of law, including human rights38.  
The tools provided to CFSP are: ‘common positions’, in which the member 
states should follow and implement as national strategies and ‘joint actions’ 
under the sponsorship of CFSP.  In this way, the Union is able to reinforce its 
international position through decisions, international treaties, declarations and 
contacts with other countries. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Secretary-
General of the Council has fulfilled the role of High Representative39 of the 
CFSP.  The current High Representative for the CFSP is Mr. Javier Solana 
Madariaga, who ascended to the post on 18 October 1999 for a period of five 
years40. 
Article II of the European Union Treaty states that one of the Union's 
objectives is to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular, through 
the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the 
progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common 
defense, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance41.     
C. THE FORMATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
(ESDP) 
The Maastricht Treaty or “Treaty on the European Union” made significant 
progress toward the creation of a mechanism that would promote the 
fundamental interests of European Union at an international level.  The 
replacement of EPC by CFSP brought Europe closer to creating a common 
defense mechanism.  More specifically, the Maastricht Treaty included an 
                                            
38 Alfredo Chamorro Chapinal, “The Security and Defense of Europe in the 21st Century-
(NATO, WEU, OSCE),” Final Report, Madrid, May 2000, p. 48. 
39 Following the debate on whether to appoint a "Mr/Ms CFSP", a new position of High 
Representative for the common foreign and security policy has now been created by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The new position is held by the Secretary-General of the Council, whose task is to 
assist the Presidency of the Union in matters relating to common foreign and security policies. 
Available at http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
40 Available at http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=248&lang=EN&mode=g, accessed 29 
March 2004. 
41 Alfredo Chamorro Chapinal, Ibid. 
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attached declaration in which “the Western European Union (WEU42) should be 
utilized and promoted as the defense component of the EU”43.  In addition, 
another early development, the creation of the Euro-corps by France and 
Germany, in May 1992, came to disturb the "stagnant waters".  France and 
Germany wanted to use the Euro-corps to facilitate the Western European Union 
(WEU) to act according to the order of EU by helping defend NATO’s territory, in 
peacekeeping activities outside the NATO area, and in humanitarian operations. 
Their components were drawn from the five - member states of France, 
Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Luxemburg and they comprised 60,000 troops44. 
Both NATO and the WEU could make use of the Euro-corps. Additionally, Great 
Britain agreed to commit 20,000 troops to that force, to be drawn mainly from its 
NATO Reaction Force (NRF). France would probably contribute the same 
number of troops; Germany offered 18,000 and Spain 6,000 men45. 
The same year, in June, in an effort to upgrade the role of WEU, the 
Foreign and Defense Ministers of WEU member States met at the Petersberg 
Hotel, near Bonn (Germany) and issued the Petersberg Declaration46.  This 
common Declaration set the new missions that the organization was expected to 
execute: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making”47. This was the 
first successful attempt at European defense integration. Also, this action gave 
new impetus to the idea of a common "European Army", and a common 
European Security and Defense Policy.  
                                            
42 Established in 1948, WEU was a defense organization separate from the EU that 
consisted of 28 countries. 
43 Available at http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
44 Francois Heisburg, “European Defense: Making it Work,” Chaillot Paper 42, September 
2000, p. 47. 
45 Eric Eagle, The Eurocorps: A European Army? Available at http://www.geocities.com, 
accessed on February 2004. 
46 On 19 June 1992, Available at http://www.daidalos-europe.org, accessed 29 March 2004. 
47 Alfredo Chamorro Chapinal, p. 50. 
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Unfortunately, this declaration did not prove forceful enough to provide a 
common political and military approach to deal with the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
and the resulting conflicts that the EU faced during the 1990s. In the beginning, 
this conflict was not considered to be a case for NATO. Luxemburg's foreign 
minister, Jacques Poos, speaking as chairman of the EC Council of Ministers, 
declared that it was  
the hour of Europe, and that if one problem can be solved by the 
Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country 
and it is not up to the Americans and not to anybody else48. 
However, whatever Europe wanted to believe about its abilities and its 
power, the reality was different. NATO was assigned very quickly with the 
mission of the implementation of the Dayton arrangements49. Nevertheless, still 
distinctive was the opinion from few observers that "The United States must stay 
out of war in the Balkans in order to stay in Europe"50. From December 1995 to 
December 1996, NATO forces were present on the ground in Bosnia as part of 
the Implementation Force, known as IFOR and a size of 60,000 troops, and since 
1996, IFOR has been replaced by another NATO-led force, the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) with a size of 32,000 troops, with only 6,000 from non-NATO 
countries51.    
The Union had been successful up to that point by exercising common 
economic policies under Pillar I but it had dramatically delayed the 
implementation of the second pillar.  WEU and NATO still retained a leading role 
in European security. Due to the dissatisfaction related to the existing division of  
                                            
48 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, 
p. 193. 
49 Ibid., p. 195. 
50 NATO Handbook, Office of Information Press, 2001, p. 116. 
51 Ibid., p. 117. 
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labor between NATO and WEU, and in order to have more room to maneuver, 
some EU member states had developed ad-hoc military and political 
arrangements to manage external crises52. 
Current work on the EU's security and defense dimension was initiated at 
St. Malo in 3-4 December 1998. St. Malo has been widely considered as the 
starting point of the ESDP project. Prime Ministers Blair (United Kingdom), 
Jospin and President Chirac (France), issued a joint declaration aimed at 
addressing all the deficiencies. France and United Kingdom agreed that:  
The EU needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage. The Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises. Europe needs strengthened armed 
forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are 
supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry 
and technology53. 
However, the real breakthrough in the development of a common security 
and defense policy came in 1999, or the year that Europe faced a vital crisis, the 
war in Kosovo.  Overshadowed by the recent war, NATO’s 50th anniversary 
Summit was held in Washington, D.C., on 24-25 April 1999. The Summit adopted 
two documents referring to the development of a European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) within NATO and the EU’s Common European Security and 
Defense Policy. The failure of the EU policies that followed Kosovo was the 
crucial point for the future decisions of the European Union and for their further 
agreements on a Common European Security and Defense Policy.  
At the informal meeting of the EU Defense Ministers on 28 May 1999 in 
Bonn, decisive steps were initiated to design the European Security and Defense 
Policy. The decisions on these steps were finally taken during the course of the 
                                            
52 Giovanna Bono, European Security and Defense Policy: Theoretical Approaches, the Nice 
Summit and Hot Issues, February 2002, p. 19, http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/esdp02.pdf, 
accessed 15 March 2004. 
53 Maartje Rutten, “From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents,” Chaillot 
Paper 47, May 2001, pp. 8, 9 and 13. 
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Summit meetings in Cologne, Helsinki, and Feira (refer to Figure 2.3).  This 
process represented a brand-new element in the European integration process 
and the group of measures formed was called European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP), which aimed to provide military capabilities to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  It was clear that the leading European 
countries pressed to move forward in the matter as soon as possible.  However, 
the relationship between ESDP and NATO military authorities was and remains 
at this time, one of the hottest issues in the negotiation of ESDP, and will be 
explored and explained further in Chapter VI of this thesis. 
1.  The Launch of ESDP 
At the European Council's Cologne Summit, in June 1999, the EU formally 
launched the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Since the 
legal basis for strengthening CFSP existed with the adoption of the Petersberg 
Tasks, the Council agreed that "the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to 
use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises 
without prejudice to actions by NATO54".  In order to achieve this goal, several 
specific institutional changes were made. As a consequence, it was agreed that 
most functions of the WEU would be transferred to the EU. This meant the 
development of new military and political structures in the EU, as follows55: 
• The new political body known as the Political Security Committee 
(PSC). The PSC has been the leading body for decision making on 
CFSP and ESDP policies and acts both as a crisis monitoring and 
management body. 
• The highest military body established within the Council known as 
the European Union Military Committee (EUMC).  EUMC provides 
military advice and recommendations on the PSC on all military 
matters within the EU as and when requested, assesses the risk of 
potential crises and makes a financial estimate of the cost of 
operations and exercises.  
                                            
54 Available at http://www.europa.eu.int, accessed 27 March 2004. 
55 Giovanna Bono, ESDP: Theoretical Approaches, the Nice Summit and Hot Issues, 
February 2002, pp. 23-24, available at http://www.esdpdemocracy.net/word/ESDP&Democracy.pdf, 
accessed 25 March 2004   
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• Finally, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). EUMS consists 
of 135 officers and support staff. EUMS role is to provide early 
warning, situation assessments and strategic planning for 
Petersberg Tasks, and to implement the policies and decisions of 
the EUMC. It still remains unclear whether the EUMS will act mainly 
as an advisory body or will be involved in planning military activities 
as SHAPE does in NATO.   
The Helsinki European Council, on 10-11 December 1999, set the 
Headline Goal (HG) in terms of military capabilities – known as Helsinki Headline 
Goal Catalogue 1999-2003 (HHC)56. It must be emphasized that the 
achievement of this goal does not involve the establishment of a European army. 
The commitment and deployment of national troops was to be based on 
autonomous decisions taken by Member States. All participating members, 
except Denmark that chose not to participate, agreed that their goals require the 
creation, by the year 2003, of an EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) with the 
following strength57: 
• more than 500 kinds of land-,air- and naval units, as well as key or 
strategic capacities in seven areas: C3I, ISTAR, Deploy ability and 
Mobility, Effective Engagement, Protection and Survivability, 
Sustainability and Logistics, and General Support. 
• a 100,000-man strong land force, which would support a force of 
60,000 troops, and being able to deploy within 60 days, to operate 
and sustain for at least one year, capable of executing the full 
range of Petersberg tasks. 
• an air element of between 350 and 400 fighter planes,  
• a naval element of 80 ships58. 
Regardless, the RRF, EU decided that it should be military autonomous, 
have command, control and intelligence capabilities, and the core of the RRF 
                                            
56 Ibid. 
57 The full details of the forces identified are confidential, but the major elements are as 
follows. 
58 Frans Osinga, European Defense: Does Anyone Really Care? June 2002, p. 4. 
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should be built from the Euro-corps59. The aim of this work was that the Union 
could become rapidly operational.  The Union had also decided to develop the 
civilian aspects of crisis management in four priority areas defined by the Santa 
Mara de Feira European Council60 (19-20 June 2000): police, strengthening of 
the rule of law, strengthening the civilian administration, and civil protection. 
2.  The Definition of ESDP   
At the Laeken European Council Meeting, in 14 and 15 December 2001, 
ESDP was proclaimed operational.  It was emphasized that the development of 
means and capabilities would allow the Union “progressively to take on more 
demanding operations61”. The European security concept prepared by Javier 
Solana indicated,  
we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and 
when necessary, robust intervention. We should think particularly of 
operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. This is an 
area where we could add particular value62. 
Since then, a new EU Capability Conference, which was held in Brussels, 
in May 2003, issued the "Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities”, 
in order to ask for more national commitments or launch specific programs to 
address current shortfalls. Progress made on capabilities and infrastructure will 
be addressed in the following chapter. The final reshape of the ESDP definition 
came with the Article 40.1 of the draft Constitutional Treaty adopted by the 
Convention (July 2003):  
                                            
59 In May 1992, the creation of the Euro-corps by France and Germany, two historical 
enemies, in the beginning came to disturb the "stagnant waters" for a common European 
Defense. France and Germany wanted to use the Euro-corps to facilitate the Western European 
Union (WEU) to act according to the orders of the EU by helping defend NATO territory, in 
peacekeeping activities outside the NATO area, and in humanitarian operations. Their 
components are drawn from the five - member states of France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and 
Luxemburg and they comprise 60,000 troops. Francois Heisburg, “European Defense: Making it 
Work,” Chaillot Paper 42, September 2000, p. 47. 
60 Available at http://www.europa.eu.int, accessed 27 March 2004. 
61 Presidency Conclusions - Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, 
http://www.ecdel.org.au/archive/Laeken%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf, accessed 7 April 2004 
62 Martin Ortega, Petersburg Tasks and Missions of the Europeans Forces, available at, 
http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf, accessed 10 April 2004. 
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The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of 
the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union 
with an operational capacity drawing on assets civil and military. 
The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for 
peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using 
capabilities provided by the Member States63. 
Moving a step forward, at the Capability Commitment Conference, on 20 
November 2000 in Brussels, EU member states presented their national 
contributions64 to meet the EU Petersberg tasks. In fact, the “Military Capabilities 
Commitment Declaration”65 expressly states that the member states committed 
themselves beyond 2003 “to medium and long-term efforts..., particularly in the 
framework of the reforms being implemented in their armed forces”66.  As a final 
point, the Nice European Council (2001) decided also that “the defense aspects 
of Europe’s CFSP will no longer be framed by the EU’s former defense arm, the 
WEU, but by the EU itself”67. 
There is already agreement on the so-called Battle Groups concept, which 
is a key instrument in the new EU military planning. Under the scheme, each 
contingent would have 1,500 elite soldiers and could be deployed within two 
weeks. Member states are to start contributing to these multinational high 
readiness joint packages at the beginning of the second semester of 2004. 
These rapidly deployable Battle Groups are supposed to be completed in 200768. 
                                            
63 Martin Ortega, Ibid. 
64 Analysis on the national contributions refer to CH.  
65 WEU Council of Ministers, Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis 
Management Operations, recommendations for strengthening European capabilities for crisis 
management operations, Luxemburg, 23 November 1999. 
66 Ibid., p. 27. 
67 Title V: Provision on a CFSP in article 17 of the Nice Treaty that replaces article 17 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom, accessed 17 March 2004. 
68“EU Defense Ministers Admit Global Responsibility,” available at 
http://euobserver.com/?aid=16141&rk=1, accessed 17 May 2004. 
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3. ESDP and Terrorism  
Furthermore, since 11 September 2001, the European Union and its 
member states have considered terrorism a vital issue of its security policy.  A 
number of initiatives have been taken to confront this problem.  Also, strong 
cooperation with the United States has been initiated when necessary.  In 
particular, the Seville European Council (21-22 June 2002) endorsed the 
following statement:  
1. The European Council reaffirms that terrorism is a real challenge 
for Europe and the world and poses a threat to our security and our 
stability. To this end, the extraordinary European Council meeting 
on 21 September 2001 decided to step up the action of the Union 
against terrorism through a coordinated and inter-disciplinary 
approach embracing all Union policies, including development of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and making the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) operational. 
2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the 
European Security and Defense Policy, can play an important role 
in countering this threat to our security and in promoting peace and 
stability. Closer cooperation among the Member States is being put 
into practice to take account of the international situation created by 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September69. 
In the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, at the Brussels European 
Council on 17-18 June 2004, the European Council adopted a wide-ranging 
declaration on terrorism, appointed an EU counter-terrorism coordinator and 
established the Visa Information System and the Europol and the Eurojust 
agreement. As regards the ESDP, the Council welcomed the report by the 
Secretary-General/High Representative on integrating an intelligence capacity on 
all aspects of the terrorist threat. On the practical and operational front, the 
European Council welcomed the re-establishment of the Counter Terrorism Task  
                                            
69 Presidency Conclusions - Seville, 21 and 22 June 2002, 
http://www.ecdel.org.au/whatsnew/2002/presidency_conclusions_seville.htm, accessed 7 April 2004 and 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/SevilleESDP&Terror.htm, accessed 18 March 2004. 
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Force within Europol.  Finally, by the end of this year and through a coordinated 
approach, the ESDP will prepare an overall strategy to enhance the protection of 
critical infrastructures70. 
However, the most significant event in the fight against terrorism is the 
EU-US declaration on Combating Terrorism at Dromoland Castle of 26 June 
2004.  The Declaration renewed the EU-U.S. commitment to developing further 
the cooperation against terrorism within the framework of the New Transatlantic 
Agenda. Emphasis is on the achievement of seven objectives, through 
transatlantic cooperation, commitment, dialogue and action at all levels71.    
4. ESDP Relations with Other Organizations 
The description of ESDP has three interesting characteristics.  First, it 
contains three sufficiently broad terms (peacekeeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening international security) that encompass all possible operations. 
Second, it does not refer to any particular geographical zone, as there were 
many who thought that it would be a mistake to introduce limitations. Third, the 
description stresses the respect for the principles of the UN Charter. Although it 
can be expected that EU forces would be used mainly in the European region 
and its neighborhood, EU forces could undertake operations in any part of the 
world. The European security concept presented by Javier Solana to the 
Thessalonica summit (Greece) points out: “our traditional concept of self-defense 
–up to and including the Cold War– was based on the threat of invasion. With the 
new threats the first line of defense will often be abroad72.”  
As far as the UN Charter is concerned, the EU and its member states 
have always stressed the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Operations undertaken by the 
EU force must have, in principle, a mandate from the UN Security Council 
(UNSC). Some EU member states have insisted that the EU should have prior 
                                            
70 Presidency Conclusions – Brussels EU Council, 17 and 18 June 2004, Paper 10679/04. 
71 EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 26 June 2004, Paper 10760/04 (Presse 205). 
72 Marin Lessenski, The Aftermath of 9/11: Implications for the European Union, available at 
http://www.iris-bg.org/publications/War_on_terror/Iris%203.pdf, accessed 12 March 2004. 
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authorization from the UN Security Council before any EU military operation. 
However, the EU force could also undertake military action in the absence of a 
UNSC mandate, if needed73. However, the situations in which this would be 
possible are quite limited: humanitarian (substantive aspect) interventions will be 
possible only when all member states agree (procedural/political aspect). If, for 
instance, there is a humanitarian catastrophe or an impending genocide, the EU 
(and European states, for that matter) would act even if a resolution from the 
Security Council cannot be obtained. In any case, as the Convention points out, 
EU military operations must always be conducted in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter74.  
The Union has also defined arrangements for the possible participation of 
third countries (European Member States of NATO which are not part of the 
Union and other candidate countries for accession to the Union) and other 
possible partners in EU military crisis management. In addition, permanent 
arrangements have been agreed upon for EU-NATO consultation and 
cooperation. Meetings between the Union and NATO, such as the Berlin Plus 
agreement of December 2002, are held on a regular basis in certain specific 
fields with a view to enabling the Union, where necessary, to launch operations 
using NATO assets and capabilities (notably planning capabilities and command 
options). The EU is not trying to compete with, or undermine NATO. The EU's 
operational focus is on lower-scale crisis management tasks, whereas NATO has 
a much broader military brief. The EU will only act when NATO is not involved75.  
In conclusion, the CFSP was launched little more than a decade ago to 
enhance Europe's capacities for common action. The policy is a necessary tool 
for a Europe that is still an economic power but lacks coordination and influence 
in security and military issues. The CFSP will be necessary for the continuation 
                                            
73 Martin Ortega, Petersburg Tasks and Missions of the Europeans Forces, available at, 
http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf, accessed 10 April 2004. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Daniel Keohane, Centre for European Reform, EU Security and Defense Policy, Spring 
2004, available at  http://www.cer.org.uk/defence/, accessed 17 April 2004. 
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of the European integration process. Part of the CSFP is the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP), which has been created to improve EU police and 
military capabilities. Figure 2.3 shows a review of the CSFP/ESDP development. 
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Figure 2.3. CSFP/ ESDP Milestones76 
 
ESDP has become operational since 2001 but there are key elements 
related to strategic mobility, command, control and communications that need to 
be surveyed. Nevertheless, someone needs first to explore the current status 
and issues related to ESDP and its Headline Goals. What are the achievements 
of ESDP concerning its police and military capabilities worldwide? Answers to 
these questions will be part of the following chapter.  
                                            
76 Figured available at, http://www.europeansecurity.net/timeline.html. accessed 29 March 2004. 
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III.  ESDP’S OPERATIONAL AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES  
The idea of a common European defense mechanism proved to be 
extremely challenging for EU’s political, military and operational capabilities.  
Following the unveiling of the common European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) and the development of new military and political structures such as the 
Political Security Committee (PSC); the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), EU member states had 
to set and meet specific objectives related to military infrastructure and human 
resources.  Member states with few exceptions agreed to support the new policy 
and share assets and expertise.    
As previously mentioned in Chapter II, the Helsinki European Council77 
set the Headline Goals (HG) in terms of military capabilities, known as the 
Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue 1999-2003 (HHC). The first Capability 
Commitment Conference, on 20 November 2000 in Brussels, determined the 
need for contribution based on the HHC, in the following areas: 
• Command and Control  
• Strategic Intelligence 
• Intelligence analysis and situation monitoring 
• Strategic air and naval transport capabilities 
• Availability, deploy-ability, sustainability, and interoperability of 
these forces 
• The (further) development of strategic capabilities in the areas of 
transport, headquarters, information and communication systems, 







                                            
77 Held 10-11 December 1999. 
 30
• Several operational capabilities in the framework of a crisis – 
management operation (among which, search and rescue, Theatre 
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD), precision weapons, logistic 
support, simulation tools).78  
A. FIRST CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPROVEMENTS AND SHORTFALLS 
EU member states presented their national contributions to meet the EU 
Petersberg tasks and the original Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) through the 
Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC). The catalogue included assets contributed per 
EU country (refer to Table 3.1) including the initial necessary infrastructure to 
form ESDP’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).   
A comparison between the HHC requirements and HFC available 
resources revealed 42 shortfalls79, which the EU had to resolve.  One of the 
clearly undermined main areas was the importance of “Electronic Warfare” since 
no provision was made for the creation of EW centre.  “Analysis of recent 
conflicts has shown that there is shortage (in NATO in general but especially in 
EU countries) on means for EW”80.  EW means are very complicated assets and 
need time to develop properly. Table 3.1, shows that only one country (i.e., 
Spain), vaguely mentioned EW. It is hardly acceptable that a sole member state 
could implement an EW concept.   
At the Capability Improvement Conference, in November 2001, EU 
members decided to create a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), in an 
effort to find and implement solutions that would suit the HGs.  
 
                                            
78 TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory, The Hague, The Netherlands & IABG, Munich, 
Germany, “New Technologies in Defense Policy and Conflict Management: A Challenge for the 
EU,” European Parliament-Directorate General for Research-Directorate A- the STOA 
programme, May 2001, p. 26, available at  http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/pdf/summaries/00-01-
01sum_en.pdf, accessed 15 March 2004. 
79 Mrs. Aguiar, Rapporteur, “European Defence: Pooling and Strengthening National and 
European Capabilities -Reply to the Annual Report of the Council,” Report submitted on behalf of 
the Defence Committee,  RECOMMENDATION 741, Document A/1842, 3 December 2003, 
available at http://assembly-
weu.itnetwork.fr/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1842.html#P71_2074, accessed 18 April 
2004.  




Land: One mechanized infantry battalion, one light infantry 
battalion, one Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense unit, one 
“humanitarian civilian assistance package,” one Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) element one transport company, 100 
observers/experts. Air: one helicopter transport squadron, 
Belgium: 
Land: one mechanized brigade, plus smaller units as part of 
humanitarian operation for up to six months.  Air: 24 F-16 fighters, 
eight C-130 and two Airbus transports.  Navy: two frigates, mine 
countermeasures (MCM) vessels. 
Finland: 
Land: one mechanized infantry battalion, one engineer battalion, 
one Transport Company, one CIMIC company.  Navy: one MCM 
command and support ship.  Joint: 15-30 experts/observers.  
France: 
Land: 12,000 troops from a 20,000 pool; Mechanized, light, 
airborne (for a year), and amphibious brigades headquarters.  Air: 
Combined Air Operations Center, 75 combat aircraft, eight air-
refueling aircraft, three long-range and 24 medium-range 
transports, two Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, 
combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopters.  Navy: Two battle 
groups, each with one nuclear attack submarine (SSN), four 
frigates, three support ships, and maritime patrol aircraft.  One 
would include the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de 
Gaulle with 22 aircraft aboard.  Mine counter-measures vessels. 
Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters at Creil if 
required, others at operational and tactical levels, satellite 
communications, reconnaissance satellites and aircraft. The 
Eurocorps headquarters has also been offered for the force.  
Germany: 
Land: Nucleus land component headquarters, up to 18,000 troops 
from a pool of 32,000 at division and brigade level, including 
armored, air assault, and light infantry brigade headquarters and 
seven combat battalions.  Air: Nucleus air component 
headquarters, six combat squadrons with 93 aircraft, eight 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons, air transport, other 
support elements.  Navy: Maritime headquarters, 13 combat 
ships, support.  Joint: Permanent military operations headquarters 
at Potsdam if required, nucleus operational headquarters. 
Greece: 
Land: one operational headquarters, one mechanized or other 
brigade, one light infantry battalion, one attack and one transport 
helicopter company.  Air: 42 fighter aircraft, four transport aircraft, 
one Patriot SAM battalion, one short-range air defense 
(SHORAD) squadron.  Navy: Escorts, one submarine. 
Ireland: 
Land: one light infantry battalion, 40-strong Army Ranger Wing 
Special Forces unit, headquarters, observer, and support 




Land: one corps-level headquarters for six months, one division 
headquarters for a year, 12,500 troops from a 20,000 pool 
(including an airmobile brigade for up to six months and three 
other brigades), one railway-engineering battalion, special forces, 
one CIMIC group, one Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense 
company.  Air: a Combined Air Operations Center (air component 
headquarters), 26 Tornado and AMX combat aircraft, six CSAR 
helicopters, four C-130J transport aircraft (from 2003), nine 
tactical transport aircraft, two air refueling aircraft, three maritime 
patrol aircraft, two SHORAD units.  Navy: A sea or shore-based 
maritime component headquarters; one task group with one 
aircraft carrier (Giuseppe Garibaldi), one destroyer, three frigates, 
four patrol ships, one submarine, four MCM ships, two 
amphibious ships, one oceanographic vessel, eight helicopters.  
Luxembourg: Land: one Reconnaissance Company Air: one A400M transport aircraft.  100 total.  
Netherlands: 
Land: with Germany, Headquarters I German-Netherlands Corps, 
one mechanized Brigade, 11th Airmobile Brigade, one 
amphibious battalion.  Air: one to two F-16 fighter squadrons; 
transport aircraft, SAM squadrons.  Navy: Air defense and 
command frigates, multipurpose frigates, landing platform dock 
Rotterdam.  
Portugal: 
Land: one infantry brigade, including reconnaissance, armored, artillery, 
engineer, signals, logistics, military police, and CIMIC elements; two 
teams of military observers.  Total 4000.  Air: squadron with 12 F-16, 
four C-130 transports, 12 C212 tactical transports, three maritime patrol 
aircraft, four tactical air control parties, four medium transport 
helicopters.  Navy: one frigate, one submarine, one survey ship, one 
support ship. 
Spain: 
Land: division headquarters to coordinate humanitarian operations and 
a brigade HQ for other operations, one brigade, mountain unit, one light 
infantry battalion at high readiness available as an immediate reaction 
force.  Air: one Mirage F-1 squadron, one F/A-18 squadron each of 12 
aircraft, six transport aircraft, two each surveillance, electronic warfare, 
and strategic transport aircraft (A400M).  Navy: one carrier group 
including carrier Principe de Asturias, two frigates and support ships, 
one submarine, one MCM ship, Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 
(SIAF).  
Sweden: 
Land: One mechanized infantry battalion including intelligence, 
electronic warfare/signals, reconnaissance, engineer, and explosive 
ordinance disposal units. Air: tactical reconnaissance element of four 
AJS 37 Viggen to be replaced in 2004 by eight JAS 39 Gripen multi-role 
fighters, one airbase unit (225 personnel), four C-130 transport aircraft.  




Joint: Permanent Joint HQ (Northwood) if required, at least one mobile 
joint headquarters, including a Combined Air Operations Center 
(CAOC).  Land: either an armored or a mechanized brigade, each of 
which could be sustained for at least a year, or 16th Air Assault Brigade, 
which could be deployed for up to six months.  Combat support forces 
such as artillery, air defense, and attack helicopters could also be 
deployed, supported by logistics forces.  Total: 12,500.  Navy: one 
aircraft carrier, two nuclear submarines (SSNs), up to four destroyers or 
frigates, and support vessels.  An amphibious task group including one 
helicopter carrier and 3rd Commando Brigade could also be made 
available.  The aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, and submarines could 
not necessarily be sustained continuously for a whole year.  Air: up to 
72 combat aircraft, including naval fighters, with 58 associated support 
aircraft including 15 tankers, strategic transport aircraft, and Chinook 
and Merlin transport helicopters.  This total would be available for an 
initial six months to cover initial theatre entry; for a longer-term 
commitment the number would reduce. 
Denmark: No contribution; decided not to be involved in ESDP. 
 
Table 3.1. Initial Contribution per EU Country81 
 
B. ECAP PERFORMANCE 
ECAP’s goal was to propose short and medium-term solutions in identified 
shortfalls, until the EU acquired the means to implement more concrete solutions 
in areas like Command and Control, EW and SEAD, Equipment Procurement, 
etc. This strategy led to 19 ECAP panels that in the end studied 24 out of the 42 
shortfalls82. ECAP panels consisted of skilled personnel with expertise in relevant 
areas and were managed by one or more member states that proved highly 
motivated and determined to reach a positive outcome.  The main framework for 
each panel was “to establish a common operational requirement, list all the 
means available and any projects in progress, identify potential areas of synergy, 
initiate or extend cooperation on future programs and come up with ideas for any 
type of joint qualitative or quantitative solution that would improve the capability 
deficit”83.  However, a broader look in this subject, along with a comprehensive 
                                            
81 Data from: CDI, Center for Defense Information, Military Reform Project, 11 September 
2002, available at http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=199, accessed 5 May 
2004. 
82 Ibid, RECOMMENDATION 741 article 46. 
83 Ibid., article 47. 
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analysis of the short falls identified in the Helsinki Catalogues, as well as the 
work of the ECAP panels have shown that overall improvement of the military 
and operational capabilities falls into the following three categories84: 
• Operational Concepts and Doctrines: creating common concepts 
for the use of a task force. NATO’s concepts and doctrines could be 
used as guidelines and adopted to the EU framework;  
• Training and Interoperability: “blending” the national forces 
effectively through joint training of personnel and exercises at 
European level. Standardization of special equipments and 
systems’ interoperability could account for smoother logistics and 
operational effectiveness;  
• Equipment Procurement: EU could enhance its military position 
based on a long-term solution that will promote the acquisition of 
the necessary hardware.  In this way, EU forces will be able to 
conduct and support military actions based on EU owned 
resources.  In this area, Member States have a difficult task as they 
will have to commit to a budget within the financial limits 
necessitated by EU’s Economic policy.   
At the Capability Commitment Conference on 19 May 2003, the 19 panels 
presented their findings and addressed specific shortfalls that fall into the 
aforementioned categories.  The first ECAP phase ended but the second phase 
has begun by taking a step further.  The 19 panels transformed into 15 project 
groups with a task to implement identified solutions for the following shortfalls,85 
in a process that appointed different Member States as project coordinators.  
1. Air-to-Air Refueling86 (AAR) - Leading Nation: Spain87 
The importance of AAF has been emphasized, especially after Air 
operations in Iraq, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.  In these current war theatres, it 
was illustrated that a robust air-to-air refueling capability is crucial to maintain 
strike operations tempo and prevent enemy’s mobility and reemergence88.  
                                            
84 Ibid., article 60. 
85 Ibid., article 49. 
86 Section information RECOMMENDATION 741, article 60 (a), unless specified otherwise. 
87 Burkard Schmit, European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), EU Institute for Security 
Studies 
88 Ripley, Tom, “Tankers in Demand” (Global Defense.Com, 2002). Available at 
http://www.global-defence.com/2002/air-refuel.html. accessed 29 March 2004. 
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However, the ratio of U.S. tanker aircraft compared to those of European Union 
members is approximately 10:189, which clearly shows EU’s lack of resources.  
The high cost of air-to-air refuel tankers which range in price from $150-$175 
million has pressed the project groups to search for alternate solutions. 
Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Spain have made the decision to convert existing 
transport aircraft into air-to-air refueling platforms.  Britain, as another alternative, 
has considered renting rather than buying new refuelers to replace their aging 
fleet.  They have proposed an $18.2 billion Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft 
(FSTA) program to provide air-to-air refueling service for the Royal Air Force 
starting in 2007.90   
During the NATO Prague Summit in October of 2002, a group of 
European countries agreed to purchase a pool of 10 to 15 air-to-air refueling 
aircraft to increase their capabilities in this area.91  These creative alternatives 
are temporary solutions that do not account for the future.  As provisional 
solutions, the ECAP Project Group has suggested converting C130 aircraft and 
hiring civilian aircraft that can be transformed into tanker aircraft using a mobile 
kit system. However, as was also suggested, the EU in the end will have to be 
empowered with a multinational fleet of tanker aircraft and take the necessary 
steps to equip the A400M with this facility.   
2. Combat Search and Rescue92 (CSAR) - Leading Nation: 
Germany93 
This area requires qualitative improvements according to the ECAP 
panels. The related Project Group examines the idea of creating a joint doctrine 
under NATO standards and then promoting joint exercises at the European level. 
 
                                            
89 General Joseph Ralston, “Keeping NATO’s Military Edge Intact in the 21st Century,” 
(Brussels, speech given at the NATO/GMFUS Conference, 3 October 2002). Available at 
http://nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003d.htm, accessed 29 March 2004. 
90 Ripley, Tom, Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
91 Tim Garden and Charles Grant, “Europe Could Pack a Bigger Punch,” Available at 
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grant_ft_17dec02.html, accessed 29 March 2004. 
92 Section information RECOMMENDATION 741, article 60 (b), unless specified otherwise. 
93 Burkard Schmit, Ibid. 
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3. Strategic UAVs94 - Leading Nation: France95 
UAVs pose a difficult task for the ECAP Project Group as provisional 
solutions could not apply.  In addition, constraints related to technology and 
funding of this project create more delays in implementing the program.   
4. NBC Protection96 - Leading Nation: Italy97 
This protection is another area in which the ECAP Project Group has to 
act as a pioneer and develop an effective initial first forum for European. 
5. Headquarters98 - Leading Nation: United Kingdom99 
The ECAP Panel agreed that the member states must obtain an adequate 
number of national headquarters, namely: 
• operations headquarters (at the strategic level in Europe);  
• force headquarters (at a combined services level in the theatre);  
• component headquarters (at the level of each service in the 
theatre).  
However, the problem is to make these HQ multinational for the purpose 
of EU-led operations. Therefore, the ECAP project Group needs to: 
• adopt procedures for "augmenting" the cores of the proposed 
headquarters to make them multinational;  
• adopt operating procedures for those "European" headquarters;  
• set up an exercise policy adapted to the different levels of 
headquarters;  
• tackle as a priority the problem of the interoperability of command 
and information systems (CIS); the architecture for a European 




                                            
94 Section information RECOMMENDATION 741, article 60 (c), unless specified otherwise. 
95 Burkard Schmit, Ibid.  
96 Section information RECOMMENDATION 741 article 60 (d), unless specified otherwise. 
97 Burkard Schmit, Ibid.  
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99 Burkard Schmit, Ibid. 
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6. Special Operations Forces101 - Leading Nation: Portugal102 
This is an area with focus centered on drafting a doctrine and creating a 
flexible, mobile and interoperable unit.  
7. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense103 (TBMD) - Leading Nation: 
Netherlands104 
The current deficit refers to TBMD systems that can be deployed at sea. 
The Project suggests partially fulfilling the need with the use of deployable 
ground-based systems until maritime TBMD systems become available. 
8. Strategic Airlift105 - Leading Nation: Germany106 
The lack of air transport and air-to-air refueling fleets among the 
Europeans limits, during the critical opening days of a mission, their ability to 
arrive at the area of operations on time. The majority of transport aircraft in the 
European’s Air Forces are C-160 Transalls, which are a third smaller than the 
smallest U.S. transport employed, the C-130.107  Both types of aircraft are 
considered tactical inter-theater as opposed to the strategic intra-theater heavy 
lift platforms that would be more applicable to the Petersberg Task missions.  
These missions are typically outside of the EU member nations’ traditional 
geographic boundaries where large carrying capabilities are needed to move 
forces and materials. 
The EU nations have just four long-range strategic transports available, 
which are the C-17s leased on long-term contract by Britain to move their 
equipment to the fight.108  This is in stark contrast to the 358 such type aircraft in 
                                            
101 Section information RECOMMENDATION 741 article 60 (f), unless specified otherwise. 
102 Burkard Schmit, Ibid. 
103 Section information RECOMMENDATION 741 article 60 (g), unless specified otherwise. 
104 Burkard Schmit, Ibid. 
105 Section information RECOMMENDATION 741 article 60 (h), unless otherwise specified. 
106 Burkard Schmit, Ibid. 
107 Cailleteau, Francois “E plubuibus unum,” in The NATO Capabilities Gap and the 
European Union, ed. David S. Yost, 101. Survival, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
108 Sloan, Elinor, “Military Matters, Speeding Deployment,” NATO Review. (Autumn 2002): 5, 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0101-10.htm, accessed 29 March 2004. 
 38
the U.S. strategic airlift fleet.109  With no equivalent to the U.S. C-141, C-17 and 
C-5 aircraft outside of those leased by Britain for strategic lift, European partners 
must then depend on U.S. lift or they are forced to resort to the leasing of aircraft 
for specific operations.  Both Germany and Britain were forced to arrange for 
leased aircraft during Operation Enduring Freedom, in order to support the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and meet mission 
committments.110    
The Europeans began addressing their strategic lift problem in June 2001 
with the decision of Germany, Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Turkey and 
Luxembourg to purchase 196 Airbus A400M aircraft.  This number was revised 
down to a program launch of 180 aircraft in the spring of 2003, with first delivery 
expected in 2009.111  The A400M cargo capacity of 81,000 lbs is comparable to 
the US C-141 cargo capacity of 68,000 lbs.  While purchases of the A400M do 
not present an immediate solution, the European Union’s commitment to address 
the strategic lift capability problem is clear.   
9. Interoperability112 - Leading Nation: Belgium113 
The Project Group has been specialized in studying interoperability 
between the European armed forces focusing on the very specific area of 




                                            
109 US Air Mobility Command, “Air Mobility Command, Providing America’s Global Reach,” 
Available at http://www.transcom.mil/missions.amc.html, accessed 29 March 2004. 
110 Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 2 May 2002, Column 957W. Available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/cm020502/text/20502w18.htm, 
accessed 29 March 2004. 
111 Airbus Military “A400 Project,” Available at http://www.airbusmilitary.com/home.html. 
accessed 29 March 2004. 
112 RECOMMENDATION 741 article 60 (i) 
113 Janne Kuusela, Ministry of Defense of Finland, “Defense Policy in the EU: Is it 
necessary?,” Work on  Military Capabilities, available at http://www.soc.utu.fi/jean 
monnet/esp/European%20Security%20Complex/Kuusela_III.pdf, accessed 14 March 2004. 
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10. Space114 - Leading Nation: France115 
The Project Group has been exploring the following parameters: 
• military utilization of space;  
• the concept of space requirements for military operations;  
• the purchase of hi-tech space capabilities through the joint 
development of demonstrators;  
• the use of a European satellite system for a variety of purposes116.    
11. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance117 (ISTAR) – Leading Nation: Sweden and the 
United Kingdom118 
The ISTAR Project Group has been appointed “to find ways of making 
good Europe's surveillance shortfalls by using AGS (Air Ground Surveillance) 
systems that rely on airborne radar equipment”119. It has been cooperating 
closely with a NATO working group. However, even though this task is crucial to 
military effectiveness, budget constraints and funding difficulties clearly shows 
that it is not feasible to implement that a solution in the near future.  
12. Strategic Sealift120 - Leading Nation: Greece121 
ECAP’a solution in this area is to place charter contracts that under crisis 
will ensure access to civilian vessels, create a European coordination centre and 




                                            
114 RECOMMENDATION 741 article 60 (j). 
115 Janne Kuusela, Ibid. 
116 Particularly for network centric warfare. 
117 RECOMMENDATION 741 article 60 (k). 
118 Janne Kuusela, Ibid. 
119 Ibid., article 60 (k). 
120 Ibid., article 60 (l). 
121 Janne Kuusela, Ibid. 
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13. Collective Medical Protection122 - Leading Nation: 
Netherlands123 
Medical units in EU require both the acquisitions of new assets and the 
upgrade of existing recourses. 
14. Attack Helicopters124 - Leading Nation: Italy125 
The recommendations of the ECAP Project stress interoperability and 
embrace the development of a joint doctrine, joint training and standardization of 
tactics and procedures.    
15. Support Helicopters126 - Leading Nation: Italy127 
The Project Group has addressed the fact that current contributions cover 
only half of what is required.  They propose short-, medium- and long-term 
solutions that include merging and joint funding programs that will enable 
member states to increase their contribution.     
C.  CAPABILITIES IMPROVEMENTS CHART 2004 
A comprehensive analysis of the shortfalls identified in the Helsinki 
Catalogues and the ECAP panels show that capabilities improvements, once 
accomplished, will allow the EU to become more effective operationally and 
improve many of the following vital areas128: 
• Command, Control and Intelligence 
• Deployment to the Theatre of Operations and Air-to-Air Refueling 
• Conduct and Support of Military Action in the Theatre of Operations 
• Survivability of Deployed Forces 
• Responsiveness and Level of Readiness of Forces 
                                            
122 Ibid., article 60 (m). 
123 Janne Kuusela, Ibid. 
124 Ibid., article 60 (n). 
125 Janne Kuusela, Ibid. 
126 Ibid., article (o). 
127 Janne Kuusela, Ibid. 
128 Many of these areas are also addressed in RECOMMENDATION 741, article 51. 
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Therefore, in an effort to monitor progress, the Council receives a 
progress report on the EU’s military capabilities every six months.  More 
specifically,  
the report presented during each Presidency contains an ECAP 
“roadmap” aimed at monitoring ECAP progress and allowing 
Member States, if deemed necessary, to redirect the work of the 
project groups created under the ECAP to address identified  
shortfalls.  This roadmap is accompanied by a “Capability 
Improvement Chart” including a state of play in the project 
groups.129   
The latest published report, known as the Capability Improvement Chart 
2004, shown in Table 3.2, monitors the current capability status.  It takes into 
consideration the requirements identified in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 as well 
as contributions from EU’s newly come member states.  The chart records 
Shortfalls and Deficits and shows their status in terms of progress. Once again, 
the aspect of the EW was not taken into consideration, although it is high 
beneficial to military personnel and contributes heavily to the success of any 
military operation. 
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129 Council of the European Union, Brussels, 13 May 2004, Capability Improvement Chart 
2004, p. 1. 
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Table 3.2 Capability Improvement Chart 2004130 
 
D. TASKS AND DEPLOYMENTS UNDER ESDP 
EU’s military capabilities were put to test with the execution of two virtual 
and four actual missions.  The chronology of events shows that the EU Military 
Staff (EUMS) was declared operational on 11 June 2001, and was based in 
Brussels.  Director-General Lt. Gen. Rainer Schuwirth of Germany was the head 
of the Military Staff.  His deputy, and chief of staff, was British Maj. Gen. Graham 
Messervy-Whiting and the staff initially had the strength of 140 people131.  
Furthermore, the EU launched an exercise program that covered the period 
                                            
130 Table from the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 13 May 2004, Ibid. 
131 Military Reform Project, Center of Defense Information (CDI), 11 September 2002, 
available at http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=199, accessed 17 March 
2004. 
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2001-2006, with a sequence of exercises designed to ensure appropriate 
readiness and efficient function in a crisis management situation. The exercises 
were designed to ensure the EU structures, procedures, including consultation 
with the UN, and arrangements were properly tested and validated in order to 
ensure the appropriate results in a Petersberg task-type crisis132.  
As a result, the first ESDP exercise entitled CME02 (Crisis Management 
Exercise 2002) under the scenario 'Save Atlantia', a virtual island in the ocean 
where Europeans are entrusted with the task of ensuring peace, took place on 
22-28 May 2002, not in the battlefield, but on paper133. The purpose of the 
exercise was to test the Union's decision-making mechanisms in a crisis 
situation. “CME02 clearly demonstrated that more efficient Crisis Management 
Procedures would be required and ignored many critical aspects of any possible 
mission; the most important of these, according to the Foreign Office, was the 
humanitarian situation on the ground”134. In any actual crisis, interaction with the  
key humanitarian agencies on the ground will be of utmost importance. In 
addition, a large-scale EU terrorist attack simulation was organized (EURATOX 
2002) on 27-28 October 2002135 in order to test civil protection capabilities. 
However, in 2003, the EU finally engaged in three missions, those in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, performing a variety of tasks, from law 
enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis 
management. The military operations were important test cases for the Union’s 
ability to apply some of the military policy instruments it envisioned under the 
                                            
132 Annual Report, available at http://www.danboyle.ie/resources.php?id=5&pid=5, accessed 7 
April 2004. 
133 EU/Terror, available at http://www.minpolitik.dk/visnyhed.php?action=info&id=1014&med=, 
accessed 14 March 2004. 
134 House of Lords, Session 2002-3, 7th Report, Select Committee on the EU, “EU-Effective 
in a Crisis?,” 11 February 2003, Published by the authority of the House of Lords, Box 3, Lessons 
Learned from CME02, p. 17. 
135 European Security and Defense Policy, available at 
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/esdpweb.htm, accessed 10 April 2004. 
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Helsinki Headline Goal 2003. These engagements were the first concrete 
demonstration of the EU’s security and defense dimension, which could lead to 
more ambitious interventions within and beyond the European periphery.  
1. European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Launched on 1 January 2003, the European Union Police Mission 
(EUPM136) in Bosnia-Herzegovina137 represented the EU’s first-ever civilian 
crisis management operation under ESDP. Taking over from the United Nations’ 
International Police Task Force (IPTF), which had been in place since December 
1995, the operation aimed to establish local law enforcement capabilities that 
could contribute to the stability of the region. The EUPM took a mandate for three 
years (until 31 December 2005) and an annual budget of €38 million, with €20 
million financed from the Community budget138.  A force of 537 police officers, 
approximately 80 percent from EU member states and 20 percent from third 
states, has been sent to perform monitoring, mentoring and inspection 
activities139.  The police officers are supported by 400 support staff. The EUPM, 
whose headquarters are located in Sarajevo, are divided in three departments, 
namely Operations, Planning and Development, as well as Administration and 
Support Services. Table 3.3 summarizes the countries and their contribution to 








                                            
136 EUPM was based on a Council decision from 11 March 2002, following the United 
Nations Security Council’s endorsement (Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002) of an EU 
engagement. On 4 October 2002, the EU signed an agreement with the Bosnian authorities that 
defined the conditions and terms of the EUPM, Ibid. 
137 EU statement on the launch of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Permanent Council No. 431, 16 January 2003, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/osce/stment/eupm160103.htm, accessed 2 March 2004. 
138 Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Operations,” EU Institute of Security Studies, 
available at http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf, accessed 2 March 2004. 
139 Ibid. 
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EU MEMBER STATES THIRD STATES 
COUNTRY TOTAL COUNTRY TOTAL 
AUSTRIA 7 BULGARIA 3 
BELGIUM 10 CANADA 6 
DENMARK 14 CYPRUS 4 
FINLAND 23 CZECH REPUBLIC 6 
FRANCE 85 ESTONIA 2 
GERMANY 83 HUNGARY 5 
GREECE 11 ICELAND 3 
IRELAND 5 LATVIA 1 
ITALY 47 LITHUANIA 2 
LUXEMBOURG 3 NORWAY 8 
NETHERLANDS 37 POLAND 12 
PORTUGAL 10 ROMANIA 9 
SPAIN 22 RUSSIA 5 
SWEDEN 15 SLOVAKIA 4 
UNITED KINGDOM 70 SLOVENIA 4 
  SWITZERLAND 4 
  TURKEY 12 
  UKRAINE 5 
TOTAL 442 TOTAL 95 
 
Table 3.3. Deployment of Police Officers (EUPM), 24 April 2003 in Bosnia-
Herzegovina140. 
 
The Danish Commander, Sven Frederiksen, was appointed Police 
Commissioner of the operation.  He had to work in close coordination with the 
Union’s (and UN) Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lord 
Ashdown. Since 1 March 2004, Assistant Commissioner Kevin Carty, succeeding 
the late Sven Frederiksen, who died on 26 January 2004, has led the Mission141.  
Lord Ashdown remains as the Special Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and reports to the Council through the EU High Representative for 
the CFSP, Javier Solana142.  The latest news concerning this mission was 
reported in the 17-18 June 2004 Presidency Conclusions as follows: “the 
European Council adopted a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia and 
                                            
140 Data from Ibid. 
141 The Council of the European Union, available at 
 http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=585&lang=EN, accessed 24 April 2004. 
142 EU and UN, EU Presidency Statement, available at http://europa-eu-
un.org/article.asp?id=2876, accessed 4 June 2004. 
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Herzegovina setting out practical arrangements to enhance the coherence and 
effectiveness of the EU’s engagement in support of the European perspective of 
the country143”. 
2. Operation “Concordia” and Operation “Proxima” in FYROM 
On 31 March 2003, the EU launched the Concordia mission in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), its first-ever military operation. EU 
forces took over NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony or "Amber Fox"  with a goal 
of contributing further to a stable, secure environment in the FYROM and ensure 
the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement144.  The EU 
force, within which France has initially acted as ‘framework’ nation, was 
instructed to patrol the ethnic Albanian-populated regions of FYROM that border 
Albania, Serbia and Kosovo. Thirteen EU member states, except for Ireland and 
Denmark, and 14 non-member states have contributed forces to the mission, for 
a total of 357 lightly armed military personnel. Table 3.4 summarizes the 
countries and their contribution to this mission. 
 
EU MEMBER STATES THIRD STATES 
COUNTRY TOTAL COUNTRY TOTAL 
AUSTRIA 11 BULGARIA 2 
BELGIUM 26 CANADA 1 
FINLAND 9 CZECH REPUBLIC 2 
FRANCE 145 ESTONIA 1 
GERMANY 26 HUNGARY 2 
GREECE 21 ICELAND 1 
ITALY 27 LITHUANIA 1 
LUXEMBOURG 1 NORWAY 5 
NETHERLANDS 3 POLAND 17 
PORTUGAL 6 ROMANIA 3 
SPAIN 16 LATVIA 2 
SWEDEN 14 SLOVAKIA 1 
                                            
143 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 17 and 18 June 2004, available at 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/81035.pdf, accessed 4 June 2004. 
144 The political accord which settled the mounting conflict between Macedonian Slavs and 
Albanians. 
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EU MEMBER STATES THIRD STATES 
COUNTRY TOTAL COUNTRY TOTAL 
UNITED KINGDOM 3 SLOVENIA 1 
  TURKEY 10 
TOTAL 308 TOTAL 49 
 
Table 3.4. Deployment of EU Force in FYROM145 
 
The operation, requested by FYROM’s President Trajkovski and based on 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371, was expected to last six 
months and it initial budget was € 6.2 million.  While Concordia constituted an 
EU-led mission, the Union relied on NATO assets and capabilities under the 
‘Berlin-plus’ arrangement. The EU Operation Headquarters were located at the 
Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. Deputy 
SACEUR, Admiral Rainer Feist (Germany), had been appointed Operation 
Commander while General Pierre Maral (France) held the position of Force 
Commander on the ground until 1 October, before handing over its authorities, 
following a Council decision, on 21 July 2003, to extend the mandate until 15 
December 2003, to Major General Luis Nelson Ferreira Dos Santos (Portugal) 
from EUROFOR. They had all worked in close coordination with the EU’s Special 
Representative in FYROM, the Belgian diplomat Alexis Brouhns. Therefore, the 
Operation Concordia in FYROM also represented the first test case for the 
strategic EU-NATO partnership for crisis management that put into effect the 
long-awaited bilateral ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement of December 2002146.  
Finally, Concordia had been succeeded by an EU Police Operation 
(EUPOL) also run by the EU. Proxima, as the 200-strong EUPOL is called, was 
launched on 15 December 2003 on the basis of a Joint Action adopted by the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council held on 29 September 2003. It 
followed an invitation from Branko Crvenkovski, FYROM’s Prime Minister, to the 
EU through High Representative (HR) Javier Solana. Proxima, aimed to help 
                                            
145 Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
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FYROM authorities develop their police forces according to European and 
international standards and focused, in particular, on supporting the 
government’s efforts to fight organized crime. The total cost of the mission was € 
15 million for the first year, including start-up costs of € 7.5 million, all funded 
through the EU budget147.  
3. Operation ‘Artemis’ (Democratic Republic of Congo)  
With the aim of preventing a large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in 
Ituri, a region in the North-East of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the 
EU responded to an appeal by the United Nations Secretary General Kiofi Annan 
and launched a military operation on 12 June 2003148.  In accordance with the 
mandate specified in UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003), the 
Artemis mission sought to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and 
the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the Ituri capital. The 
multinational force was mandated to protect camps of internally displaced 
persons, secure the Bunia airport as well as ensure the safety of the civilian 
population, UN personnel and the wider humanitarian presence. The force 
encompassed about 1,800 soldiers, mostly French149.  
The operation ended on 1 September 2003. The last elements of the force 
left Bunia on 6 September, after returning full responsibility to the UN mission 
(MONUC), now provided with a wider mandate, more robust rules of 
engagement, and an 18,000-strong multinational force. France was, once again, 
the ‘framework’ nation for the Artemis mission: Major General Neveux was 
appointed EU Operation Commander and Brigadier General Thonier EU Force 
Commander. Both worked in close coordination with the EU’s Special 
Representative in the region, the Italian Aldo Ajello. The Planning Headquarters 
were located at the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations 
(CPCO) near Paris, France, the Operational Headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda, 





with an outpost in Bunia. In addition to France, the United Kingdom and Sweden 
contributed combat troops. Belgium and Germany provided non-combat forces, 
while non-EU contributors include Canada, South Africa and Brazil150.  
Artemis was the EU’s first military operation outside Europe and, unlike 
the other two missions, did not rely on NATO assistance. Although limited in time 
and scope, Artemis was an undeniable success from a military point of view. The 
military intervention was prepared in a very short period of time, involving all the 
EU members in the decision making process regarding planning and rules of 
engagement.  Cooperation on the ground between participating nations, 
especially France and Sweden, was efficient. Beyond military intervention, the 
EU decided on a three–pronged strategy for Ituri: first, to help disarm, 
demobilize, and reintegrate armed groups, particularly children; second, to 
prepare a socio-economic rehabilitation program; and third, to give an immediate 
€ 200 million aid package from its European Development Fund (EDF) in order to 
create an ethnically mixed police force151.  
Talks are still under way regarding the possibility of the EU launching a 
police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to assist the interim 
government in Kinshasa in creating a countrywide police force.  At the 17-18 
June 2004 Presidency Conclusions, the EU stated its deep concern about the 
situation in Congo and urged Congo’s neighboring countries to support the peace 
process and concluded by stating that “EU stands ready to support these 
countries in these efforts152”. 
E. LESSONS LEARNED  
Major General Jean-Pierre Herreweghe, Deputy Director General and 
Chief of Staff, Council of the European Union, in an effort to draw useful 
feedback from operations Concordia and Artemis missions stated that: 
 
                                            
150 Ibid. 
151 Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP: an Overview,” Institute of Security Studies, available at 
http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf, accessed 7 April 2004. 
152 17/18 June 2004 Presidency Conclusions. 
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• both missions have been successful 
• the EU can react rapidly and autonomously at long distances from 
Brussels 
• more “strategic lift capacity” is needed 
• communications between HQs and staffs must be improved 
• political decisions should be implemented in the field, e.g. no 
reserve troops were provided despite an agreement at the political 
level153 
In addition, Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff, Desk Officer for NATO, 
Délégationaux Affaires Stratégiques, French Defence Ministry, stated that: 
• Concordia and Artemis proved that the ESDP is operational, even if 
they were both limited in scope 
• both were launched in order to prove ESDP's operational status 
• they proved that ESDP works even when the CFSP has limitations, 
as they were launched during the Iraq crisis 
• both operations involved the concept of the ‘framework nation’ – an 
old practice previously deployed in Rwanda, Haiti, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. The UN recognizes that this is the most appropriate tool 
for peace enforcement. 
• Both missions demonstrated: 
• the EU’s rapid reaction capability 
• excellent co-operation with the UN 
• the EU’s willingness to get involved with crisis 
management154 
Overall, the EU demonstrated, under the ESDP status, not only that it can 
become a useful tool of crisis management in the Balkans, but also an 
international actor promoting the idea of multilateralism. The European Security 
and Defense Policy also proved adequate enough to support, in its early steps, 
different type of missions, although many areas are still under development.  
 
                                            
153 New Defense Agenda - Working Group ‘A’ Meeting – 29 September 2003, available at 
http://www.forum-europe.com/publication/SOD_29_September_2003withparticipantslist.pdf, accessed 2 
April 2004. 
154 New Defense Agenda, Ibid. 
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F.   FUTURE GOALS 
The formation of ESDP allowed the EU to create an active military 
framework and become a potential actor in responding to international crises and 
assisting UN requests.  The EU showed determination in introducing effective 
instruments to implement the Petersberg Tasks.  Moreover, with a successful 
beginning and an on going development process, the Member States have 
chosen to set a new Headline Goal, “reflecting the European Security Strategy, 
the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology”155. This time, the 
EU member states have decided to “commit themselves to be able by 2010 to 
respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the 
whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the treaty on the 
European Union”156.  The EU’s readiness is to be expanded in the area of “joint 
disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism 
and security sector reform”157.    
Furthermore, taken into consideration the existing shortfalls, deficits and 
the feedback acquired from the initial operations, the Union addressed the need 
for forces that “are more flexible, mobile and interoperable”158.  As a result, there 
has been already an agreement among member states for the creation of a new 
military unit, called the Battle Groups, which seeks to become a key instrument in 
the new EU military planning. Battle Groups will have the size of a battalion, 
around 1,500 highly trained soldiers. The units 
                                            
155 Headline Goal 2010, available at 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headlines%20goals.pdf, accessed 15 June 2004. 
156 Ibid., p. 1. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Headline Goal 2010, Ibid. 
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should be available within 15 days notice and sustainable for at 
least 30 days (extendable to 120 days by rotation)  They should be 
flexible enough to promptly undertake operations in distant crises 
areas (i.e. failing states), under, but not exclusively, a UN mandate, 
and to conduct combat missions in an extremely hostile 
environment (mountains, desert, jungle, etc).159  
Member states are to start contributing to these multinational "high 
readiness joint packages" at the beginning of the second semester of 2004. The 
rapidly deployable Battle Groups are supposed to be completed in 2007160.  The 
ultimate aim is for EU “to be able to take the decision to launch an operation 
within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council 
with the ambition that the forces start implementing on the ground, no later than 
10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation”161.  
As a result, the Member States have identified the following milestones 
that need to be implemented by 2010: 
• as early as possible in 2004, …the formation of a civil-military 
cell162 within the EUMS that will have the ability to set-up rapidly an 
operation centre for a particular mission; 
• the establishment of the Agency in the field of defense capability 
development, research, acquisition and armaments (European 
Defense Agency) in the course of 2004; 
• the implementation by 2005 of EU Strategic lift joint coordination, 
with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full 
efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) in support of anticipated 
operations; 
• the transformation of the EACC into the EAC by 2004 is accepted, 
in an effort to develop a European Airlift command fully efficient by 
2010; 
• the complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battle-
groups163 including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, 
sustainability and debarkation assets; 
                                            
159 “EU Defense Ministers Admit Global Responsibility,” available at 
http://euobserver.com/?aid=16141&rk=1, accessed 17 May 2004. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Plan to be established within 2004. 
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• the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and 
escort by 2008; 
• the development of appropriate compatibility and network linkage of 
all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and 
space based by 2010; 
• and finally the development of quantitative benchmarks and criteria 
that national forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in 
the field of deploy-ability and in the field of multinational training164. 
In the Brussels European Council 17-18 June 2004 Presidency 
Conclusions, the European Council among others decided the following: 
The European Council endorses the Headline Goal 2010. The 
European Council also endorses the Action Plan for Civilian Crisis 
Management and welcomes the steps taken to further improve EU 
capacity to undertake military rapid response operations for crisis 
management.  It also endorses the elaboration of modalities under 
which the EU could provide military capabilities in support of the 
United Nations. 
The Council also referred to the on-going missions in FYROM and Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a success and welcomed the progress made in the first EU Rule 
of Law mission under ESDP, which is to start shortly in Georgia.  In addition, the 
Council included in the conclusions a section named “Specific Situation of 
Concern” involving countries, (i.e., Sudan, Iran and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo), that face or could initiate an international crisis, if the existing core 
problems pointed out by the council are not monitored properly.  Based on the 
Conflict Cycle analyzed below, EU’s involvement in these cases could result in 
medium or high intensity conflicts, the kind of encounter that requires careful 
planning and advance military capabilities.      
G. THE CONFLICT CYCLE 
The HGs 2010 initiate ESDP’s second phase of development.  During the 
first phase, EU led forces were able to manage, based on Figure 3.1, Positive 
                                            
163 Recall from Chapter II that Battle Groups are supposed to be completed in 2007. Member 
states are to start contributing to these multinational "high readiness joint packages" at the 
beginning of the second semester of 2004.  It seems so far, that Battle groups are able to restore 
the shortfalls in major areas. 
164 Headline Goal 2010, Ibid., p. 2. 
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Peace, Negative Peace, Tension, Crisis and Low Intensity Conflicts.  These 
tasks, however, remained limited in scope and depended heavily on resources 
obtained from key EU member states. Nevertheless, operation Concordia 
illustrated the effectiveness of the “Berlin-Plus agreement”165 under which NATO 
resources were shared for the common good.  NATO’s readiness, as shown in 
Figure 3.1, embraces a wider spectrum of conflicts. With the unique contribution 
of U.S. resources and technological know-how, NATO has the knack to operate 
autonomously in any part of the world. Missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
are recent examples of NATO’s response to an international crisis.    
                                            
165 More information available at http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm, 
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Figure 3.1. Conflict Cycle166 
                                            
166 Table from: Alfredo Chamorro Chapinal, LT General of the S.A.F. (Res), NATO 
Fellowship Holder, “The Security and Defense of Europe in the Twenty First Century (NATO, 
WEU, OSCE),” Final Report, Madrid, May 2000, p. 115, available at www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-
00/chamorro.pdf, accessed 14 March 2004. 
 60
The EU, on the other hand, has taken significant steps towards becoming 
a liable international actor. Motivation in this direction is high and the fact that the 
UN has requested the EU’s assistance with operation Artemis has shown that it 
considers the EU a capable force.  The EU, in this case, acted on time and 
troops were on the ground within a week, as the Council approved the Congo 
operation without delay.  However, in high intensity conflicts, i.e., Iraq, the EU 
failed to establish a common position among member states.     
The world today has entered an era of continuous violence and the fact is 
that no organization has all the necessary recourses available to support the 
current global situation.  As shown in Figure 3.1, medium and high intensity 
conflicts, characterized by forceful military intervention and war respectively, are 
at this point beyond the EU’s capabilities without proper NATO assistance.  If the 
Headline Goals 2010 are to be implemented, the EU be able to act autonomously 
when entering medium or high intensity conflicts.  An area that will enhance EU’s 
military autonomy is the development of an Electronic Warfare (EW) unit based 
on NATO’s standards.167.  Although EW has been addressed as an area of 
importance, such as the Gulf war and the Kosovo air campaign, none of the 
existing ECAP panels have tackled the issue in terms of a project.  EW is an 
important function in all types of conflicts during the preparation, planning, and 
execution phases. It is also very critical with respect to interoperability in coalition 
operations.  The following chapters emphasize the need to focus on EW as a 
military and critical asset for the implementation of the Petersberg tasks, the 
autonomy and overall performance of the European forces, and the assistance of 
allied organizations.   
 
                                            
167 A variety of proven taxonomies exist for listing military functions, capabilities and 
technology areas such as the taxonomy used in the Science and Technology (SCITEC) Study, by 
Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), military functions based on NATO MC 299/3 
TNO Physics and Electronics Laboratory, p. 47, Ibid. 
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IV.  ELECTRONIC WARFARE AS A CRITICAL ASPECT FOR 
THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ESDP AND THE 
EU RAPID REACTION FORCE 
Military operations are executed in an increasingly complex 
electromagnetic (EM) environment. Today, both civilian and military 
organizations, for communications, navigation, sensing, information storage, and 
processing, as well as for a variety of other purposes, use EM devices. The 
increasing portability and affordability of sophisticated EM equipment guarantees 
that the electromagnetic environment in which military forces operate will become 
more complex in the future. The recognized need for military forces to have 
unconstrained access using the electromagnetic environment creates 
vulnerabilities and opportunities for EW in the support of military operations. In 
Joint operations, such as ESDP’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) future operations, 
EW is one of the integrated capabilities used to conduct information operations 
(IO)168.  
For this reason, the EW remains one of the most critical civilian, military 
and technological assets for the improvement of the common ESDP and the 
RRF. Moreover, today, EW is viewed not only as a defense but also as an attack 
mechanism.  This chapter highlights the importance of EW in military operations 
and introduces the Improved Many on Many (IMOM) model which is a battle 
tested Air Force Computer simulation of EW effects. A description of the basic 
IMOM functions follow in order to appreciate the potential of the appropriate 
IMOM tools in support of operational planning.  Moreover, Chapter V provides an 
illustration of the model in an imaginary scenario under the name “Save Atlantia 
2008”.  Nevertheless, in order to understand better the concept of EW, some of 
the definitions extant in the literature need addressing.   
 
 
                                            
168 Joint Publication 3-51, “Joint Doctrine for EW,” 7 April 2000, doctrine prepared for the 
U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, p. 1-1. 
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A.  EW: DEFINITIONS 
There are many views and definitions emphasizing the importance of EW 
in the military environment.  According to D. Curtis Schleher,  
EW is a military action whose objective is to control EM spectrum.  
To accomplice this objective both offensive electronic attack (EA) 
and defensive electronic protections (EP) are required.  In addition, 
electronic warfare support (ES) actions are necessary to supply the 
intelligence and threat recognition that allow implementation of both 
EA and EP169. 
In order to understand the military terminology and EW’s main 










Figure 4.1. EW Terminology170 
 
However, a broader view of EW is that of Antony E. Spezio, who states: 
EW is an important capability that can advance desired military, 
diplomatic, and economic objectives or, conversely, impede 
undesired ones. …. In a military application, EW provides the 
means to counter, in all battle phases, hostile actions that involve 
the EM spectrum-from the beginning when enemy forces are 
mobilized for an attack, through to the final engagement171.  
                                            
169 D. Curtis Schleher, “Electronic Warfare in the Information Age,” Artech House, 1999, p. 
xi. 
170 Ibid., p .2-2. 
171 Antony E. Spezio, “Electronic Warfare Systems,” Invited Paper, IEEE Transactions on 
Microwave Theory and Techniques, Vol. 50, No. 3, March 2002, p. 633. 
EW
Any military action involving the use  
of electromagnetic and directed energy  
to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.
The three major subdivisions are Electronic Attack (EA),  
Electronic Protection (EP), Electronic Warfare Support (ES) 
EA 
That division of electronic warfare involving 
 the use of electromagnetic  
or directed energy to attack personnel, 
 facilities or equipment 
with the intent of degrading,  
denaturizing or destroying  
enemy combat capability.      
EP
That division of electronic warfare involving 
actions taken to protect personnel,  
facilities and equipment from any effects  
of friendly or enemy employment  
of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize 
or destroy friendly combat capability.       
 
ES
That division of electronic warfare  
involving actions tasked by  
or under direct control of,  
and operational commander  
to search for, intercept,  identify and  
locate sources of intentional and  
unintentional radiated electromagnetic 
energy.
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Another definition is that of Filippo Neri:  
The techniques and technologies that lead to the constructions of 
devices capable of electronically countering a weapon system, and 
to the development of counter-countermeasures go under the name 
EW.172 
Finally, the U.S. Joint Doctrine for EW explains: 
In military operations, the term EW refers to any military action 
involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to control 
the EM spectrum or to attack the enemy173. 
B.  ELECTRONIC WARFARE AS A SIGNIFICANT COMPONENT OF 
“COMMAND AND CONTROL” 
Command and control systems (C2) allow military leaders to improve and 
substantiate their decision-making. In this area, EW is a critical aspect and “fits 
well in the current revolution in military affairs”174. In today’s battlefields, a key 
goal is to produce confusion and to disorient an enemy commander from his 
forces. This function involves well-trained personnel and sophisticated 
techniques supported by EW systems.  ESDP has addressed the importance of 
Command and Control but has not followed NATO’s footsteps in the area of 
relating this function with EW.   
As discussed further in Chapter VI, NATO has implemented the concept of 
EW since 1966, the year in which the Electronic Warfare Advisory Committee 
(NEWAC) was established.  According to NATO’s handbook, NEWAC was 
created 
to support the military committee, the NATO Strategic Commanders 
and the nations by acting as a joint, multinational body to promote 
an effective NATO EW capability. It monitors progress achieved 
nationally and within the Integrated Military Command Structure in  
 
                                            
172 Filippo Neri, “Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems,” Second Edition, Artech House, 
2001, p. 3. 
173 Ibid., Joint Publication 3-51, p. vii. 
174 Ibid. Schleher, p. xi. 
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implementing agreed EW measures. It is responsible for the 
development of NATO’s EW policy, doctrine, operations and 
educational requirements and contributes to the development of 
command and control concepts175. 
Following NATO’s steps, ESDP needs to address this issue and 
incorporate effectively EW’s three main pillars including: 
• Electronic Attack (EA) is used for Electronic Countermeasures 
(ECM). This pillar utilizes electromagnetic energy weapons. Hard 
Kill Weapons: anti-radiation missiles, electronic jamming/deception. 
Soft Kill Weapons: jammers, or directed energy weapons to attack 
personnel, facilities, or equipment in the interest of degrading, 
neutralizing, or destroying combat capability.  
• Electronic Protection (EP) is used for Electronic Counter-
Countermeasures (ECCM). EP is any action taken to protect 
personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or 
enemy employment of EW. Such an example could be the de-
confliction of assigned communications frequencies and clearance 
for jamming activities. 
• Electronic Warfare Support (ES) is used for Electronic Support 
Measures (ESM).  ES are any actions to provide information 
required for immediate decisions involving EW operations, threat 
avoidance, targeting, and homing. An example could be an aircraft 
(EP-3) monitoring an enemy’s communications network to identify 
which nodes appear to be critical and the value each nodes adds to 
their assigned network.   
In addition, Electronic Warfare (EW) has also many sub-divisions, mainly 
related with offense, support and defense, as shown in Table 4.1. 
 
OFFENSIVE EW SUPPORTIVE EW DEFENSIVE EW 
Electronic  Attack (EA) 
 Non–Destructive 




o Directed Energy 
 Destructive 
o Anti-Radiation Missiles 
Directed Energy 
EW Support (ES) 
 Threat Warning and Recognition 
 Collection Supporting EW 
 Direction Finding 
 
Electronic Protection (EP) 
 Protect from Friendly EW 
o Emission Control 
o EW Frequency 
Deconfliction 
 Protect from Enemy EW 
o Emission Control 




Table 4.1. EW Sub-Divisions176                                             
175 NATO Handbook, NATO office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 324. 
176 Data from: Schleher, Ibid., pp. 6-10. 
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1. Electronic Warfare and Air Operations 
Electronic Warfare (EW) has been an important component of military air 
operations since the earliest days of radar. Radar, EW, and stealth techniques 
have involved over time as engineers, scientists, and tacticians have struggled to 
create the most survival and effective joint force possible. Several recent events 
suggest that airborne EW merits congressional or constitutional attention. 
Operation Allied Forces, the 1999 NATO operation in Yugoslavia, and the recent 
wars against terrorism, appear to have marked an important watershed in the 
debate over current and future EU or U.S. airborne EW.  
Especially for the United States, it appears that every strike on Serbian or 
Iraqis targets was protected by radar jamming and/or SEAD aircraft. Electronic 
countermeasures self protection systems, such as towed radar decoys, were 
credited with saving numerous NATO or U.S. aircraft that have been targeted by 
Serbian or Iraqi surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The U.S. Defense is engaged in 
numerous activities, such as research and development (R&D) programs, 
procurement programs, training, experimentation that are designed to improve 
various electronic attack (EA), ECM, and SEAD capabilities both in the near and 
long term.  
The EU, however, does not demonstrate the same enthusiasm concerning 
these activities.  They often cut across bureaucratic boundaries and budget 
cuttings, which makes it difficult to determine and access DoD-wide EW 
priorities. Often, it appears that every European Union DoD or the ESDP has no 
single, coherent plan for coordinating all these efforts or setting priorities. As it 
seems so far, the EU parliament disagreed with many of these plans by rejecting 
budget requests, and reduced or constrained some programs accordingly177.  
Nevertheless, in order to maintain the HHG 2003, the Headline Goal 2010 
was created as a temporary solution as well as a smaller and more effective 
force, the EU seven- to- nine Battle Groups, consisting of 1500 well-equipment                                             
177 Dr. Frank Umbah, “The Future of the ESDP,” Repots and Analyses 20/03, Center for 
International Relations, 6 September 2003, available at www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/rap_i_an_2003.pdf. 
accessed 29 March 2004. 
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men. It remains to be seen whether these new Headline Goals and the mobilized 
forces will realize the significance of EW. The following paragraphs offer a brief 
description of a software tool, the IMOM Model, designed to help the planning 
and the decision making process and maximize the level of success in an air 
attack scenario.  
C. IMOM MODEL 
The Improved Many-on-Many (IMOM) model is a computer software 
program simulating Electronic Warfare effects. IMOM was originally developed at 
the 453rd Electronic Warfare Squadron (EWS) at the U.S. Air Force Information 
Warfare Center (AFIWC). In 1989, it became a part of a project initiated by the 
U.S. Air Force Electronic Warfare Center (AFEWC) and the Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Using modern software 
engineering paradigms, (INEEL) has re-engineered the software, as shown in 
Figure 4.2, to execute in heterogeneous environments. The result is a fast, 
efficient model that provides detailed detection information studies and analysis 
for numerous field users. The AFIWC IMOM [Improved Many (radars)-On - Many 
(jammers)], is presently in use by the U.S. Air Force to model the Electronic 
Order of Battle (EOB) for pilots on operational missions178. 
                                            
178 INEEL, Need to Know, A National Security Newsletter, “Evolution of a Program- The 
Electronic Combat System Integration,” Volume 1, Number 4, July 2001, available at 
http://www.inel.gov/nationalsecurity/newsletter/jul2001.pdf, accessed 29 March 2004. 
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Figure 4.2. IMOM Model, Version 6.6 
 
This thesis verified the IMOM results against the basic Radar Range 
Equation. Particular attention was paid to the method of modeling coherent pulse 
and CW radar based on the concern that the inputs and outputs should be 
maintained unclassified. In summary, it was demonstrated that simulation results, 
using the basic IMOM radar range equation adaptations, agreed with radar 
theory. In addition, the manner in which the radar range equation was modified 
by IMOM to account for stand-off-jamming effects was also reviewed. Typical 
operational values were substituted into these equations and results compared to 
those calculated by IMOM. The internal version number of the IMOM software 
associated with this thesis is the latest IMOM version 6.6 (August 2003). 
However, before presenting the imaginary scenario and viewing the actual 
benefits of the IMOM model, it will be helpful to have a brief analysis of the IMOM 
model and its components and functions.  Background information has been 
retrieved from various sources, but the core source was INEEL, which played a 
key role in the development of this product.   
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1. Overview179 
IMOM is part of the Contingency Theater Automated Planning System 
(CTAPS).  CTAPS is the “heart” of the Theater Battle Management Combat 
System (TBMCS) for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). 
CTAPS has the Combat Intelligence System (CIS) integrated to make actual 
intelligence information available to the Air Campaign Planners (ACP). In this 
way, the JFACC staff can access current intelligence, and support the production 
and execution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO)180.  
IMOM visually displays the complex interaction of multiple radar systems 
being acted upon by multiple ECM aircraft. IMOM models the detection 
capabilities of radar at virtually any altitude, considers target aircraft radar cross-
section and altitude, terrain masking effects, and both stand-off jamming (SOJ) 
and self-protection jamming (SPJ) effects. IMOM is capable of loading a detailed 
Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) either manually or from virtually any system that 
maintains an automated feed and provides hard copy output analysis results in a 
wide variety of formats. The results of this model aids in the placement of 
standoff jammers against several defensive (air, land or sea based) radar 
systems in order to protect the friendly striker aircrafts181. In any scenario, the 
IMOM model is used to: 
• Display enemy anti-aircraft weapon locations and can access the 
effectiveness of friendly employment of self protection measures 
• Generate Orders of Battle  
• Target Nomination List 
• Produce weaponeering options 
• Threat evaluation. 
                                            
179 All the following information regarding the IMOM Model retrieved from, (unless specified 
otherwise), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), “Model 
Description (MD) for the Improved Many-On-Many (IMOM) Version 6.6, Solaris 2.8 and Windows 
2000,” Electronic Combat System Integration Project, WFO 90737, 1 August 2003. 
180 INEEL, Ibid. 
181 INEEL, Ibid., p. 254. 
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In other words, pilots and mission planners use the software to determine 
the range of hostile radar and weapons systems and to model effects of friendly 
jammer signals used against these radar systems. With this information, they are 
able to plot a route that will avoid detection or minimize the risk through the 
appropriate countermeasures. Moreover, they can run different scenarios that 
include potential countermeasures182. Finally, there are a number of automated 
planning tools available to help joint EW planners execute their responsibilities. 
These tools can be divided into three broad categories; databases, planning 
process aids, and graphic analysis tools. What is unique with IMOM is its ability 
to combine all the three above categories effectively into a single model.  
2. Components 
The IMOM model uses the following Electronic Combat (EC) components 
as described in detail in the Model Description (MD) manual. A general 
description of the key elements follows along with a brief explanation of their 
usage. 
• Airborne183.  Airborne components allow analysts to model airborne 
radar systems. 
• Antenna184.  The antenna is a key component for SOJ, receivers 
and transmitters. 
• Electronic Intelligence Notation (ELNOT)185. The ELNOT 
component establishes a mapping between an ELNOT and one or 
more equipments which use that ELNOT. This component is used 
as a mechanism for identifying particular equipment (either radar or 
weapon). 
• Jammer186.  One of the primary purposes of this model is to 
calculate the effects of an electronic jammer against one or more 
radios in the network. Due to the simplicity of the jammer 
component, jammer parametric data is specified at run time, rather 
                                            
182 INEEL, Need to Know, A National Security Newsletter, “Evolution of a Program- The 
Electronic Combat System Integration”, Volume 1, Number 4, July 2001.  
183 Ibid., “Model Description (MD) for the Improved Many-On-Many (IMOM) Version 6.6,” p. 
5. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid., p. 6. 
186 Ibid. 
 70
than being stored in the database. Jammer parametric data 
includes the jammer's location, altitude, heading, output power, 
bandwidth, and jammer type. Other parameters not explicitly stated 
are the jammer's operating frequency and the antenna pattern. The 
jammer's operating frequency is based on parameters specified 
through any of the analysis functions. The antenna pattern is then 
determined based on the jammer type and the operating frequency. 
• Order of Battle (OB)187.  The OB is defined as the collection of 
radar and weapon sites to be considered in an analysis. The key 
information used by the analysis from the OB is the site location. 
The site’s parametric database file provides the parametric data 
regarding the site.  
• Radar188.  The radar component describes a radar system in terms 
of the electronic signal emissions of interest to the IMOM model. 
Key elements of this component include radar function, emitter 
power, main beam (each radar can have up to 20 beams), side 
lobes and back lobe information (each radar can have up to 4 side 
lobes and 4 elevation side lobes). This component also included a 
Signal to Noise (S/N) ratio calculator for both Swerling cases I and 
II alpha and beta. As a Probability of False Alarm (Pfa), the IMOM 
uses 1x10-6 and for Probability of Detection (Pd) using 0.5 for radar 
types Early Warning (EW), Target Acquisition (TA), Height Finder 
(HF) and 0.9 for Target Track (TT) and Fire Control (FC). 
• Route189.  A route is defined by any number of route legs or points. 
For leg-based routes, each route leg has an associated start point, 
end point, altitude-specified as the mean sea level (MSL) or above 
ground level (AGL), and spacing between analysis sample points. 
For point-based routes, each point has an associated location, 
heading and altitude.  
• Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Weapon190.  The 
SEAD weapon component supports the SEAD Footprint analysis 
and the SEAD Radial analysis. The SEAD weapon component 
represents the coverage of any user defined weapon system that 
may be launched from an aircraft. The data is represented in three 
dimensions. In elevation, the user can define any number of altitude 
cuts. The altitude represents the launch altitude in FT AGL. The 
azimuthally values are the range of the weapon in nautical miles. 
                                            
187 Ibid., p. 7. 
188 Ibid., p. 7. 
189 Ibid., p. 9. 
190 Ibid. 
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• Stand-Off- Jammer (SOJ)191.  The SOJ component is also shared 
with the IMOM model. The SOJ model consists of a number of 
oscillators generating electronic noise into the environment, with 
specific frequencies, powers, and areas of coverage for each 
oscillator. 
• Weapon192.  The weapon component allows the user to describe 
various weapons systems, such as AAA’s, SAM’s, Close-in 
Weapons Systems (CIWS’s), etc. 
3. Analysis Functions 
The IMOM model is comprised of seven basic analysis types: Contour, 
Maximum Range, Radial, Route, SEAD Footprint, SEAD Radial, and Site-to- 
Point. Each of the analysis includes the effects of signal strength, geometry, 
ECM, and terrain masking using actual digitized terrain data. The following table 
(Table 4.2) provides a description for every function.  
 
Detection Contour Analysis 
The contour analysis is used to analyze detection capabilities of the entire OB 
depicting threat engagement zones or outer limits of detection. The results drawn 
on the map look much like contours drawn on a geographic information system 
map showing common elevations. In the contour analysis, search radar detection 
contours, weapon radar detection contours, threat envelope contours and 
jamming contours are drawn. This analysis may include SOJ effects.   
Detection Maximum Range Analysis 
The Maximum Range analysis is used to provide a quick look maximum range 
study on the OB. For radar, the maximum range analysis calculates the 
maximum radar range of the various radar using the radar cross section (RCS) 
parameters specified, calculates the maximum line of sight (LOS) range based 
on the MSL altitude(s) and then plots the contour of the minimum of these two 
values for the entire OB. For weapon systems, the analysis plots either the 
maximum effective range or maximum kinematical range of the various weapon 
systems. The differences between the contour and maximum range analysis are:  
(1) no terrain masking occurs in the maximum range analysis and (2) the 
maximum range analysis result is a filled contour. The purpose of this analysis is 
to analyze a larger number of sites very quickly to yield a first order 
approximation of the detection capabilities of radar systems against a certain 
target aircraft as well as determine the various weapon ranges.   
                                            
191 Ibid., p. 10. 
192 Ibid. 
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Detection Radial Analysis 
The Radial analysis is normally performed on individual sites in the OB. This 
analysis is used for modeling detection capabilities. In a radial analysis, the 
model simulates moving a target along radials extending away from each site 
being analyzed. The analysis will move the aircraft along each radial in 
incremental steps. The step size will be a multiple of the current terrain resolution 
(specified in meters by the users at  100m for this research). Each of the radials 
in the radial analysis is color- coded depicting the resulting status for that point 
on the radial back to the site.  The purpose of this analysis is to determine the 
overall threat/detection capabilities of a weapon/radar/airborne site against a 
target at a specified altitude. The analysis constructs radials on each up to 360 
degrees around each radar site, depicting the detection capabilities of the 
weapon/radar up to a maximum distance away from the site. The analysis may or 
may not include the effects of SOJ and/or SPJ. 
Detection Route Analysis 
The Route analysis depicts the vulnerability/capability of a specific aircraft along 
a pre-defined flight path or route. Route analysis is used for modeling detection 
aircraft in conjunction with the sites in the current OB. As the route is described in 
the route scenario editor, each leg in a leg-based route is described with a leg 
spacing attribute that determines the analysis points for that route leg. In a point-
based route, the analysis points at that route leg. In a point-based route, the 
analysis points are the points defined in the route. During a route analysis, each 
of these analysis points is analyzed against ALL the sites of the OB and an 
overall status is determined for this route point. As a result, the purpose of this 
analysis is to determine the detection vulnerability of the specified target aircraft 
against the sites in the OB. Each route point is colored according to its 
vulnerability. 
SEAD Footprint Analysis 
A Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) footprint analysis aids in the 
planning of missions with SEAD weapons (i.e., anti-radiation missiles, for this 
research, HARM AGM-88). A SEAD footprint analysis depicts the possible target 
area around the launch aircraft of the selected anti-radiation missile. Inside the 
footprint, the line of radials extends from the launch aircraft to the SEAD 
weapons maximum range considering radar antenna height, terrain and aircraft 
heading. Finally, the question answered at the end is: What can my SEAD 





SEAD Radial Analysis 
A Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) radial analysis aids in the planning 
of missions with SEAD weapons. A SEAD radial analysis displays the SEAD 
weapon launch area around EACH OB site, considering aircraft height, terrain 
masking from the site to the aircraft height and the maximum launch range for 
the SEAD weapon on the aircraft. In other words, the results of the SEAD radial 
analysis depict the vulnerability of that site against an aircraft flying at the altitude 
specified, loaded with the SEAD weapon.   
Detection Calculator (Point - to - Point) Analysis 
The analysis calculator allows the user to perform simple point-to-point detection 
analyses. The inputs to the calculator are primarily independent of the current 
scenario (i.e., OB, Routes, etc.). The results of the calculator are posted in a text 
window and are not displayed on the map. 
 
Table 4.2. IMOM Analysis Functions193 
 
4. Core Functions 
Table 4.3 illustrates the core functions, as presented by IMOM Model’s 
Description Manual.   
 
Radar Model194 
i. Radar Geometry.   
The radar parametric data defines the geometry for the scan limits, and also for each of 
the radar beams and lobes. These values are converted into cosine values for use in the 
analysis code. 
ii. Radar Range Equation 
The radar range equation is a critically important element of the IMOM model. At the 
lowest level of the analyses, the model uses RCS in the radar range equation (square 
meters) for determining the maximum detection distance for a radar system. Should the 
user specify an analysis be performed using LOS, Max Airframe, Frequency, or 3D 
Airframe, various types of lookups are performed to convert the user supplied data to an 
RCS. If LOS is specified, a value of 100,000 square meters will be used for the RCS.  If 
Max Airframe is specified, the model will extract the maximum RCS from the aircraft 
parametric data files based on the appropriate frequency. If frequency is specified, 
looking up the frequencies of the radar beams in the specified frequency file and 
extracting the appropriate RCS for that frequency determine the RCS. If 3D Airframe is 
specified, then the RCS is determined by using current target aircraft geometry in 
relationship to the site to derive the appropriate RCS value from the aircraft parametric 
data. The radar range equation, as used in the model is specified in Equation 4.1 
 
                                            
193 Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
194 Ibid. pp. 12-13. 
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      (Equation 4.1) 
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R:  Radar range (dB) 
Pt:   Radar power (dB) 
Gt:  Transmitter Gain (dB) 
Gr: Receiver Gain (dB) σ :  Radar Cross Section (dB) 
c:  Speed of light 
Pc:  Pulse Compression Gain (dB) 
B:  Bandwidth (dB) 
Fn :  Noise Figure (dB) 
K :  Boltzmann’s constant 
To:  Temperature at 290o   (Kelvin) 
F:  Frequency (dB) 
SNRI:  Signal to Noise with Integration (dB) 




i. SOJ Geometry 
This portion of the jamming model calculates the geometry information between each of 
the SOJs in the jammer collection and the site being analyzed. A line of site 
determination is made between each of the jammers in the scenario and the site being 
considered. The results are stored in a data structure for use in jamming calculations 
later in the process.   
ii. SOJ Coverage 
SOJ coverage determines which jammers, within LOS, covers the radar being analyzed, 
To determine if the radar is covered, the following checks are made: 
1. Is the radar signal frequency within the transmit frequency range 
of at least one SOJ station? 
2. Is the radar site within the SOJ’s transmitting antenna beam 
azimuth? 
If the SOJ can cover the radar then the effectiveness for each station (that covers the 
radar) is calculated. The effectiveness is defined as the part of the burn through range 
equation that is not dependent on the radar’s antenna gain in the direction of the 
jammer. SOJ coverage returns the maximum and cumulative (additive) station 
effectiveness and a list of all SOJs that are effective against each radar beam.   
iii. SOJ Effectiveness  
SOJ effectiveness is determined as follows: 
1. Determine the maximum and cumulative station effectiveness 
from SOJ coverage 
2. Add the appropriate radar antenna gain(s) to each station 
3. Use the jamming techniques file to determine if multiple jammers 
are summed or not 
                                            
195 Ibid. pp. 13-18. 
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4. Use either the maximum or cumulative effect of all the SOJs to 
calculate the burn through range of the radar along the line of 
bearing. 
iv. Burn-through range Equation 
The following equations show how the burn through equation for IMOM is derived, by 
first starting by determining the jamming to signal strength ratio at the detector surface 
(Equations 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) 
Radar Signal Strength @ Detector Equation (4.2)   
2
3 4(4 )








Jammer Signal Strength @ Detector Equation (4.3)         
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4(4 )j j rj T r
j j P t t r pc T
PG G R BJ
S R B L PGG G
π
σ=  





j p t t r pc T
j j rj r





  + ∆    =    
 
(4 )
j p t t r pc T
j j rj r





  =    
 




S S N S
 = + ∆    
 
Therefore, the IMOM burn through range is (Equation 4.6):   
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v. SPJ Effectiveness 
At this point, IMOM gets the SPJ parametric data for the specified SPJ aircraft. Then, it 
loops through each of the entries in the parametric data looking for a match on pod and 
equipment code. If a match is found, then it subtracts the AGL altitude of the target 
aircraft measured directly above the weapon from the AGL pod altitude specified in the 
parametric data (this is consistent with the SPJ parametric data). By keeping the 
matched entry with the smallest difference, IMOM could then look up the SPJ 
effectiveness for that entry. It will be either a 1 (POOR SPJ), 2 (FAIR SPJ), or 3 (GOOD 
SPJ). If no matches are found, then SPJ effectiveness will be POOR SPJ. 
vi. Antenna Polarization Loss 
The jamming burn through equation defines a term for antenna polarization loss. This 
loss is determined by a look up table within the code. For more information about 
Polarization Loss, refer to the IMOM MD manual. 
vii. Terrain Model –Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) 
IMOM uses Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) for all of its terrain masking and 
geometry calculations. IMOM retrieves the data in raw DTED formats supporting both 
level 0 and level 1 data from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). DTED 
values represent the terrain elevation values referenced to mean sea level (MSL) datum 
recorded to the nearest meter. The horizontal position is referenced to precise longitude 
– latitude locations in terms of the current World Geodetic System (WGS), determined 
for each DTED file by reference to the origin at the southwest corner.  The elevations are 
evenly spaced in latitude and longitude at the interval of the terrain resolution. 
Requested locations are rounded such that the closest DTED terrain post is used. 
viii. Terrain Masking Model 
The method used in the analyses to determine terrain masking is by computing the look 
angle from the site to the target aircraft and also the look angle from the site to the 
highest surface terrain point between the site and the point directly below the target 
aircraft. If the look angle to the terrain is greater than the look angle to the target aircraft, 
then the target aircraft is terrain masked. (This comparison is done using the cosines of 
the angles.  The algorithm uses the law of cosines and a cosine identity to construct an 
equation which determines the look angles as cosine values. These values may then be 
compared to determine terrain masking). Figure 4.3 shows a quite similar terrain 
analysis such as that of IMOM. 
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Figure 4.3. Terrain Analysis196 
 
Table 4.3. Core Functions197 
 
Quality personnel, through training and experience, are the origin of 
operational decision superiority. The goal should be to provide technical decision 
support tools, such as IMOM, to improve the commander’s ability to gather, 
access, analyze, act on data and also make timely and informed decisions. The 
following chapter, “Save Atlantia 2008”, illustrates the abilities of the IMOM model 
in an imaginary scenario and provides recommendations for taking the necessary 
steps towards the application of an effective EW unit in the ESDP.     
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V.  EU’S RRF SCENARIO “SAVE ATLANTIA 2008” 
For the purpose of this thesis, the IMOM model was used to simulate a 
future RRF engagement in a high intensity conflict. The databases used are 
unclassified.  
A. THE SCENARIO  
An imaginary task in 2008 requires an EU air campaign against a high 
threat environment in the south mainland of Greece (Peloponnesus). In this 
scenario, called “Save Atlantia 2008”, a specific Air Task Order (ATO) assigned 
an Air Interdiction (AI) operation: Its goal is to destroy, neutralize, divert, and 
delay the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively 
against friendly forces. Typical targets include petroleum, oil, and lubrication 
storage centers (POL), lines of communication (LOC) and lines of supply (LOS). 
A significant force of EU fighter aircrafts (F-16, M-2000, Tornado and Harriers) 
with other support assets (AEW, SEAD and Stand-Off Jammer aircrafts) can take 
off either from the EU carrier located in Aegean Sea or land bases, can carry 
large payloads, fly a relatively long distance, at low or high altitudes and 
accurately deliver the ordnance such as dumb bombs and laser-guided bombs 
(LGBs) day and night by using the Targeting Pod of the LANTIRN system. Figure 




Figure 5.1. NAI and the Available DTED Coverage  
 
B.  MISSION PROFILE 
The fuel requirements for this mission led directly to the choice of mission 
profile. Mission profile defines the altitude structure of the route of flight and is 
typically described in terms of “ingress altitude-attack altitude-egress altitude”. 
The high profile has the most economical fuel expenditure, and the low has the 
highest fuel expenditure. For this mission flown at the maximum range of the 
aircraft, a common profile choice was “high-low-high profile”. This profile saves 
fuel to and from the target but allows a low altitude attack. In addition, keep in 
mind the threat along the way. A high ingress may be advantageous from a fuel 
burn perspective, but may be ill-conceived when taking into consideration en-
route AAA, Air or SAM threats. Figure 5.2 shows the profile and the Area of 




OUR BASE  
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Figure 5.2. Mission Profile198 
 
 
Figure 5.3. AOI and Threats 
                                            
198 After: Figure available at http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/air_combat/mission2/fig8.jpg, 
accessed 12 May 2004. 
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C. MISSION COMBAT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS- INGRESS 
In this simulation, assume the scenario of having just crossed into an 
enemy’s country. The part of this mission from the sea or land base to the target 
is known as the “ingress phase” (Figure 5.4).  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Ingress Phase199 
 
In many respects, the ingress can be just as challenging and exciting as 
the actual attack. Pilots used to say, “Getting there is half the fun.” There are 
many dangers and obstacles lurking along the route to the target and these 
challenges will be either overcome or maneuvered to avoid them. The bottom 
line is the need to arrive at the target with enough fuel, weapons, and aircrafts to 
guarantee target destruction. The lack of any or all of these because of enrooted 
mistakes jeopardizes the mission before it even begins, which is not desired, and 
therefore, attention to ingress considerations is an excellent way to ensure the 
outcome. Line abreast formations (spread) for flight at medium to high altitude 
and where an air threat is likely. They provide the best six o’clock lookout for all 
flight members.  Angled back formations, such as “wedge,’ are well suited for low 
level flight when terrain avoidance is a significant consideration. An effective 
route in and out of the target area was planned, and the waypoints replotted to 
take advantage of the mountainous terrain. The Initial Point (IP) was located no 
                                            
199 Figure available at http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/air_combat/mission2/fig9.jpg, accessed 
12 May 2004. 
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more than two to three minutes from the target. At typical attack speeds, 450-480 
Knots, this equates to approximately 15 to 25 miles. The priority during the run-in 
is target location and target ID, threat activity, followed by navigation.  
When planning the mission, it is necessary to meet timing requirements, 
such as meeting the air-refueling tanker at a specific time, rendezvousing with 
AEW and other EW support forces, and hitting the target at a given time. The 
Time on Target (TOT) is one of the highest priority goals of the entire mission.  
Once the “fence” is crossed, hostile country is entered and it is imperative to be 
prepared. At this phase, intelligence can use IMOM information to brief the 
Combatant Commander or the pilot going into combat. Moreover, modern 
warfare is conducted with sophisticated detection and communication systems. 
Survival is dependent on knowing where those systems are and the range of 
their detection and operation. Figure 5.5 shows a detailed IMOM maximum range 
analysis of the AOI and a maximum weapons range. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Maximum AOI Range Analysis and maximum Weapons Ranges 
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D.  MISSION COMBAT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS- ATTACK 
The best attack plan is one that assures target destruction and maximizes 
the enemy’s surprise and confusion. The run is planned to achieve two things: 
approach the target unobserved or undetected and terrain masking to best 
advantage. The large ship formation is divided into two elements to attack from 
opposite directions at the same time as shown in Figure 5.6.  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Attack Phase200 
 
The high threat situation includes Surface Air Missiles (SAMs) and radar 
controlled large caliber and Anti-Aircraft Artilleries (AAA). Support in ECM and 
stand-off weapon capability has mitigated this rule of thumb to some extent. It is 
still possible for the purposes of this simulation; however, to maintain the 
traditional assumptions regarding low altitude ingress/terrain masking techniques 
in a high threat area of mobile SA-19 systems. SAMs and AAA defend the target 
well, and as a result, it is possible to plan a low altitude, pop-up attack using 
terrain masking, as shown in Figure 5.7.  The intent is to use ECM support with 
Stand-Off Jamming (SOJ) and stand-off weapons or delivery methods 
continuously. It is necessary, however, to avoid a re-attack of the target.  
                                            
200 Figure available at http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/air_combat/mission2/fig11.jpg, accessed 
12 May 2004. 
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Figure 5.7. Low Altitude/Pop-Up Attack201 
 
E.   MISSION COMBAT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS- EGRESS 
The ingress route is not the same as the egress route. The egress route is 
planned considering the fuel state, tanker location, nearest friendly border/area, 
and terrain, as shown in Figure 5.8.  
 
 
Figure 5.8. Egress Phase202 
                                            
201 Figure available at http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/air_combat/mission2/fig12.jpg, accessed  
12 May 2004 
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Also planned is a climb to an optimum fuel conservation altitude as soon 
as possible, threat permitting, as well as an emergency recovery plan for any 
battle damaged aircrafts to land in a divert field. Finally, the mission includes a 
safe recovery plan. This a pre-briefed plan that makes it possible to approach the 
base and be seen as incoming friends.   
F. IMOM ROUTE ANALYSIS 
The EU Air Force can accomplish this specific Air Task Order (ATO) either 
by using SOJ or not. The following IMOM simulation shows the real aircraft 
detection from all threats in the AOI, and provides a report, which suggests the 
best Course of Action (COA) in the pre-planned route.  By initiating a detection 
contour analysis, as shown in Figure 5.9, the IMOM program analyzes each site 
(Radar, SAM, AAA), which is already in the OB. Then, based on the flying 
altitude of the target in the specific AOI, as shown in Figure 5.10, the results of 
Figure 5.11 are calculated. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Initiating a Contour Analysis 
 
                                            
202 Figure available at http://www.simhq.com/simhq3/sims/air_combat/mission2/fig15.jpg, accessed 
12 May 2004 
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Figure 5.10. Aircraft’s Altitude and AOI Analysis 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Contour Analysis of the AOI 
 
Figure 5.12 shows a more detailed representation of the AOI. Zooming-in 
provides a more detailed analysis of each radar or weapon site. 
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Figure 5.12. Zoom in the AOI 
 
The next step is to request the Radial Analysis of each site. are shown in 
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show the graphical results. Appendix A shows the detailed 
Route Analysis Reports. Based on this analysis, and in order to avoid detection 
from a specific threat, it is then possible to first modify the altitude for terrain 
masking that suggested from the report, change the route, or lastly, modify the 
SOJ parameters in order to be more effective in a specific threat (EW Radar, FC 
Radar, SAM, AAA etc.). 
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Figure 5.13. Radial Analysis of AOI 
 
 
Figure 5.14. AOI Radial Analysis 
 
G.   CREATION OF DATABASES FOR IMOM – ESDP SCENARIO 
The Stand-Off Jammer (SOJ) Scenario Editor provides the means to add, 
modify and delete SOJ aircraft in the current scenario. The SOJs are assumed to 
be stationary, but each jammer may have multiple transmitters, with multiple 
time-multiplexed oscillators and its own jamming technique. Figures 5.15 and 
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5.16 shows SOJ sites added to the IMOM-ESDP scenario with unique jammer 
parameters, aircraft altitude and heading information. Next,  prime function of 
IMOM analyzed and displayed the EC environment conditioned by the effects of 
SOJ. The process of defining SOJ configurations depends upon establishing 
appropriate transmitter, and jamming techniques files. Generally, the data files 
necessary to accomplish this were provided with the model. The SOJ editor 
provided the ability to add/modify SOJs in the current scenario, load/modify the 
stations (transmitters) per SOJ, and add/modify time-multiplexed oscillators to 
each SOJ station, also described in Appendix C. 
 
 
Figure 5.15. Stand of Jammer Editor/Parameters 
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Figure 5.16. SOJ Editor/Noise Jamming Mode 
 
The radar parameters shown on the radar form provide both geometry and 
operational parameters of the specific radar.  The IMOM Model Description 
manual provides a detailed description of each of the parameters as well the use 
of each one in the analysis functions. Figures 5.17 and 5.18 provide the radar 
parameters form, and a description form for the EW radar TPS-43, respectively. 
For the purposes of this scenario, similar databases were created for several 
radar function types such as AEW, Fire control (FC), Target Tracking (TT), Early 
Warning (EW) Radar, Height Finder (HF) or Target Acquisition (TA) radars part 
of which is shown in Appendix B (i.e., Radar TPS-43). 
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Figure 5.17. Radar Parameters form for TPS-43 Radar 
 
 
Figure 5.18. Radar Description Form for TPS-43 Radar 
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Finally, the weapon function provides the means to define capability 
envelopes for any weapon system. The system capability envelopes can be 
thought of as 3D volumes about the weapon defined by the minimum effective 
range, maximum effective range, maximum kinematic range and altitude. As 
regards the ranges, the minimum and maximum ranges specified in nautical 
miles correspond to the weapons lethal envelope. The effective range, shown in 
red in the Weapon Lethality Display, represents the effective range of the 
weapon system to acquire and engage a target, and is used by IMOM to perform 
the most of the analyses.  The kinematic range, which is how far the missile can 
travel, is shown in a transparent red in the Weapon Lethality Display. For the 
purposes of this scenario, a database, also described in Appendix C, was 
created with several weapons systems, shown in Figure 5.19. 
 
 
Figure 5.19. Weapon Parameters for 2S6 System-“GECKO” 
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At this point, it is commendable to mention that it is possible to direct 
IMOM’s graphical outputs to various map overlays or in another mapping 
software product, such as Falcon View.  Falcon View, an integral part of Personal 
Flight Planning Software (PFPS), is a Windows 95 and Windows NT mapping 
system that displays various types of maps and geographically referenced 
overlays. Falcon View is a separately installed product and is not packaged with 
the IMOM installation CD. As a result, and in order to keep this thesis 
unclassified, an attempt was not made to present any map overlay for the 
outputs of the scenario “Save Atlantia 2008”. However, by reviewing the following 
Figures 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22, which already exist in the literature, the reader may 
have a better understanding of it is possible to combine the IMOM results with 
the Falcon View software.  
 
 
Figure 5.20. IMOM Graphic Representation Combined with Falcon View203 
 
                                            




Figure 5.21. Contour Analysis in IMOM Model Combined with Falcon View204 
 
 
Figure 5.22. Radar Radial Analysis in IMOM Model Combined with Falcon 
View205 
                                            




H.  IMOM MODEL CONCLUSIONS 
It has been obvious that in the aforementioned planning procedure, IMOM 
played an important role. Based on the model results, the EW component air 
planners206: 
• Determine the type, geographic location, and level of hostility 
expected during the operation to be planned. 
• Determine the type of Electronic Support (ES) platforms and 
products available to support the operation. 
• Determine the number and type of EW platforms that could 
reasonably be expected to be tasked to support the joint operation 
being planned. 
• Review the requirement for EW support to the SEAD effort.  
• Recommend to the Operation Director (J-3) or Plan Director (J-5) 
staff the type and number of EW assets to be requested from 
component or supporting commands. 
• During Crisis Action Planning (CAP), evaluate each Course of 
Action (COA) considered with respect to EW resources required 
and the EW opportunities and vulnerabilities inherent in the COA.   
In addition, it is important to remember that IMOM is not a time-consuming 
process. It is a quick, flexible and useful decision making tool, both for 
Commander’s or Staff Estimates, particularly in a time constrained environment. 
Finally,  
EW planners should have an understanding of how such modeling 
systems are computing the graphics being displayed. Such an 
understanding, combined with operational experience, is the basis 
on which planners must rely to judge the strengths and 
weaknesses of different modeling tools and determine what is and 
is not an appropriate use of such systems207. 
I.  EW IN THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
It is a main goal of this thesis to emphasize the need for EU to consider 
EW seriously.  The creation of a joint doctrine for Electronic Warfare among the 
member states is an important step towards military effectiveness and success.  
                                            
206 Joint Pub 3-51, Ibid. 
207 Joint Pub 3-51, p. III-9. 
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Moreover, the nominal organization of staff functions to plan and execute EW 
and the command relationships of EW in joint EU operations should be as 
follows208: 
• The RRF Commander should assign missions; organize EW forces 
and direct coordination of joint EW operations.  
• The RRF Targeting Coordination Board, through a macro view of 
the battlefield, should resolve conflicting component priorities.  
• The RRF Staff Operation Director (similar to J-3 in NATO) should 
have primary responsibility for EW activity. Authority for planning 
and supervising joint EW is normally delegated by the RRF 
Commander to the RRF Force Staff Operation Director. When so 
authorized, the RRF Force Staff Operation Director will have the 
primary staff responsibility of planning, coordinating, integrating, 
and ensuring execution of joint force EW operations.  
• The RRF Intelligence Director (similar to J-2 in NATO) should be 
responsible for timely processing of intelligence for EW; evaluates 
planned EW operations in order to identify intel requirements and 
other conflicts with intel collection operations; advise RRF 
Commander, RRF Force Staff Operation Director on risks of 
Electronic Attack (EA) employment, and frequencies to be guarded 
to RRF Staff Communications Electronics Director (similar to J-6 in 
NATO). Finally, the director should support tactical deception plans.  
• The RRF Staff Communications Electronics Director should be 
responsible for coordinating the use of an EM spectrum for C4 
systems and weapons, as well as developing the RRF Restricted 
Frequency list. 
However, each military service has a different approach to organizing their 
forces in order to plan and execute EW. Since this thesis uses the Air Force as a 
core example, due to the importance of EW in the success of the mission, it is 
essential to emphasize the following.  Within the Air Force component, there are 
dedicated EW support assets under the operational control of the Air Force 
Commander. Within the Air Force Commander headquarters, the office of 
primary responsibility for EW should be the RRF Operations Directorate (such as 
A-3 for NATO) and RRF Plans Directorate (such as A-5 for NATO). Functional 
                                            
208 Functional planning, directing and control of Air Force EW assets are normally conducted 
by the JFACC through the Joint air operations center’s Director and its Information Warfare 
Team, by means of Air Task Orders (ATOs). Information retrieved from Joint Pub 3-51, “Joint 
Doctrine for Electronic Warfare,” 7 April 2000. 
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planning, directing, and control of Air Force EW assets, however, should be 
normally conducted by the RRF Air Force Component Commander through the 
joint air operations center’s Director and its Information Warfare Team, by means 
of the ATO. In response to the ATO, wing and unit level staffs and individuals 
aircrews should then develop the detailed tactical planning for specific EW 
missions. In the scenario “Save Atlantia 2008”, the planning and the decision-
making process followed the steps, used in any real military scenario, 
summarized in Table 5.1.  The real competitive advantage in this process is the 
testing of the scenario when using the IMOM Model.   
 
Military Decision Making Process  
 Receipt of mission (ATO) 
 Mission Analysis 
o Situation development 
o Crisis assessment 
 COA development 
o Model EW effects 
o Supports staff estimates for each COA 
 COA Analysis (Route Analysis Report-IMOM) 
o Utilize automated models 
o War game in conjunction with other EW COAs  
 COA Comparison and Decision 
o Brief  RRF Air Commander, and RRF Operations 
Directorate 
 Execution Planning – Orders Production 
 Execution 
 
Table 5.1. Steps in the Military Decision Making Process 
 
J. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To summarize this chapter, it is concluded that EW plays a vital role in the 
development of ESDP.  It will provide RRF with an enormous advantage and the 
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ability to increase effectiveness during operations.  It is possible to make many 
recommendations in this field.  The following list emphasizes areas in which 
ESDP should pay initial attention.   
• Organize EU’s RRF to Plan and Execute Electronic Warfare: 
Following NATO’s footsteps, undoubtedly the leader in this area, it 
is necessary to create an ESDP’s Electronic Warfare Plans 
Directorate (EWPD) and an ESDP’s Electronic Warfare Operations 
Directorate (EWOD).  EU member states will have to contribute 
skilled manpower and technical infrastructure.  A broader 
knowledge of EW systems capabilities and components is 
essential.  Both directorates should have the primary responsibility 
of planning, coordination, and integration of the joint Rapid 
Reaction Force in EW operations.  
• Develop a RRF Operational Doctrine for Electronic Warfare: The 
new policy should provide a doctrinal guidance on the use of EW in 
RRF’s joint operations. Furthermore, it should focus on staff 
organization, planning procedures, coordination during operations, 
training and exercise considerations, and allied and third countries 
considerations in planning and conducting joint EW.  
• Increase the Interoperability with NATO Assets: The ESDP should 
cooperate with NATO wherever and whenever necessary.  Joint 
standards and practices procedures as well as repeated exchange 
of information between ESDP and NATO are a crucial factor in the 
development of a highly effective RRF EW unit.  
• Establish an EW Exercise Planning Policy and EW Activities:  Joint 
exercises are the only way to exercise RRF’s Electronic Warfare 
capabilities in mutually supportive operations. These exercises will 
give a unique opportunity for EW staff personnel to prepare, plan, 
execute any EW scenario and evaluate the EW officer’s 
responsibilities, the risks in the operational area and the type of 
mission which the staff must plan.  
• Examine the Multinational Aspects of EW: The EW planners must 
provide EW support to allied or other non-EU countries, as ESDP’s 
EW is an integral part of multinational operations. 
• Procure a Certain Number of Available Automated Planning Tools: 
There are several planning tools, such as the IMOM model. These 
tools could help joint EW’s planners to execute their 
responsibilities, in time constrained environments.  
• Increase the Defense expenditures- Limit the Equipment 
Procurement: “Each year, the intensity and sophistication of 
electronic combat increases. All means, including tactics, 
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technology, and superhuman fortitude, are applied to prevail in the 
EW battle”209. However, today, EU countries have dedicated 
resources more to personnel and equipments and much less to 
R&D programs. Overall, it seems necessary that ESDP should 
devote more money to R&D.  EU countries should have a twofold 
obligation: they must not only spend better but also spend more.  
Last but not least, the EU‘s member-states contributions in EW personnel 
and assets should become a commitment.  If an EW unit is to be implemented, 
member states should be prepared to share technology, manpower and commit 
an adequate budget for the plan’s execution as well as for R&D programs. 
                                            
209 Spezio, Ibid., p. 644. 
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VI.  EU AND NATO TEAM-WORK ENDEAVOR  
The main goal of this thesis is to emphasize the need for the EU to take 
EW seriously.  The creation of a joint doctrine for Electronic Warfare among the 
member states is an important step towards military effectiveness and success.  
However, since EU does not possess the financial and military resources to 
implement a project of this magnitude on its own, NATO’s contribution and 
guidance in this area remains critical.  Therefore, it is important to provide a quick 
review of the current relationship status between the EU and NATO, in order to 
identify areas of divergence and cooperation. The role of the United States will 
also be examined, since it maintains a dominant position in NATO’s decision-
making process.  Finally, a review of the main dialogue events between the EU 
and NATO will show how this relationship has been progressed since the 
creation of the ESDP.     
A.   AN AFFAIR “MADE IN EUROPE” 
Established in 1949, based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter210, 
NATO provides the most complete military platform in terms of military 
capabilities and technology of the 21st century.  Currently, the Alliance has 26 
members, as shown in Table 6.1, out of which 19 are members of the EU. As 
described in NATO’s handbook, refer to Table 6.2, the Alliance performs a wide 
range of security tasks focusing mainly in the Euro-Atlantic stability and well- 
being. The EU, in this matter, through its newly developed Security and Defense 
Policy covers an area that involves mainly crisis and humanitarian duties.  It is 
apparent that the EU by implementing the ESDP concept has made a strong 
effort to build a solid European military identity and despite the reassurance that 
it will work in cooperation with NATO, there are areas that overlap and demand 
serious consideration.   
                                            
210 NATO Handbook, p. 31, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm, 
accessed 15 March 2004. 
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NATO Countries EU Countries 
1949: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Britain, 
US. 1952: Greece, Turkey.  1955: 
West Germany. 1982: Spain. 1999: 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland. 
2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia 
1958: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands. 1973: 
Denmark, Ireland, Britain. 1981: 
Greece. 1986: Spain, Portugal.  1995: 
Finland, Austria, Sweden. 2004:  
Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Cyprus.  
Total: 26 Total: 25 
Note: Underlined NATO Countries are members of EU. Total of 19 out of the 26.  
 




To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable 
Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of 
democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to 
intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force. 
Consultation: 
To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, 
as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on 
any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible 
developments posing risks for member’s security and for 
appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common 
concern.   
Deterrence and 
Defense: 
To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against 
any NATO member state as provided for in Article 5 and 6 of the 
Washington Treaty. 
Crisis Management: 
To stand ready, case by case and by consensus, in conformity 
with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty to contribute to effective 
conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management 
including crisis response operations. 
Partnership: 
To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, dialogue with 
other countries in the Euro Atlantic area, with the aim of 
increasing transparency, mutual confidence, and the capacity for 
joint action with the Alliance.211 
EU Petersberg Tasks 
 Humanitarian and Rescue 
 Peacekeeping 
 Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 
 Joint disarmament operations 
 
Table 6.2. NATO Tasks vs. EU’s Petersberg Tasks 
                                            
211 NATO Handbook, Ibid. 
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The role of the United States in this relationship has always been decisive.  
During the 1990’s, with the Europeans totally preoccupied by integration and 
economic growth, the United States shared more responsibilities and more risks 
in the global arena.  As a result, the norms of behavior on which transatlantic 
relations were based were about to change.  At this point, it is important to reveal 
that the transatlantic alliance “was never a relationship of equals”212. WWII 
considerably damaged Europe’s economy and military infrastructure.  Thus, the 
power imbalance was noticeable.  However, the United States used to be very 
careful in projecting its power within Europe and NATO. More specifically, the 
alliance used to operate under certain unwritten rules, “the United States would 
consult and listen to its allies, seeking a measure of international or multilateral 
legitimacy before taking action”213.  A glimpse into NATO’s defense 
expenditures, as shown Figures 6.1 and 6.2, identifies the central financing role 
that the United States has played in the alliance.  This role also accounts for the 
U.S. attitude as a “guarantor of European security”214. The figure also shows how 
NATO-Europe defense expenditures215 have progressed since the 1980’s.  
European contribution is still strong216 but the United States remains the central 
pillar of this alliance increasing its financial contribution since the 1980’s by 
177.67%217.   
 
                                            
212 Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War, McGraw-Hill, 2004, p. 24. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Leslie S. Lebl, “European Union Defense Policy. An  American Perspective,” Policy 
Analysis, No. 516, Cato Institute, 24 June 2004, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa516.pdf, 
accessed 2 June 2004. 
215 Note that “NATO –Europe” includes contribution from countries, (i.e., Turkey, Norway, 
Iceland) that are not yet members of the European Community.  However, more than 80% of the 
“NATO-Europe” contribution is made by EU countries. 
216 European-NATO since the 1980’s raised their contribution by 78.64%.  Data retrieved 
from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-146e.htm, accessed 15 July 2004. 
217 Ibid. 
 104












  NATO - Europe 111,981 92,218 186,189 184,352 179,668 164,349 160,519 176,097 200,039
  US 138,191 258,165 306,170 278,856 280,969 301,697 312,743 356,720 383,720
  Total 255,122 357,949 503,906 472,284 468,957 474,338 481,779 541,343 593,268
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003e
 
Figure 6.1. NATO Defense Expenditures218 
 
NATO Expenditure  2003
 "US vs NATO-Europe"








Figure 6.2. US vs. NATO-Europe “NATO Defense Expenditures in 2003”219 
 
                                            
218 Data retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-146e.htm, accessed 15 July 2004. 
219  Ibid. 
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B.  MILITARY CAPABILITIES - THE WEAK LINK 
NATO’s March 1999 intervention in Kosovo, clearly illustrated U.S. military 
supremacy and exposed EU’s military deficiencies, showing how “gaps in 
defense spending and technology220” all these years have affected EU’s military 
status.  The U.S. monopolized operations and played a significant role in this 
major European issue.  During the conflict, the U.S. demonstrated superiority in 
the areas of: (1) all weather delivery of precision guided munitions; (2) electronic 
warfare support and attack; (3) aerial refueling; (4) strategic lift; (5) Command, 
Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR)221.    
The development of ESDP and the ECAP panels have tackled, within 
EU’s budget framework, many of the areas. However, “European nations on the 
whole do not posses the political will to support the development of such power 
projection force at this time”222 mainly because the success of the European 
integration has shifted the EU focus towards economic prosperity and not 
towards military supremacy.   
There is, however, a paradox in this area. Table 6.3 shows the Annual 
average strength of EU countries that are NATO members while Figure 6.3 
compares EU strength with U.S. military strength. It is evident that as a total, EU 
forces are dominant in numbers, but these numbers do not avow for EU’s military 
superiority.  They represent an old mentality that concentrates on human power 
but is lacking in technology.  Today, EU efforts have been focused on the 
development of RRF and the battlegroups towards more flexible armed forces, 
but as a whole, the military reorganization of member states will require more 
energy and more budget than initially projected.                                                
220 Samantha Paige Davis, Part IV, The ESDP and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, 
available at www.fsk.ethz.ch/documents/ Studies/volume_11/vol11_partIV.pdf.pdf, accessed 2 
April 2004.  
221 Edward G. Gunning, Jr., The Common European and Defense Policy ESDP, USAF 
Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado, INSS Occasional Paper 41, 
Regional Security Series, July 2001, p. 1, available at http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/ocp41f.pdf, 
accessed 15 March 2004.  
222 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Figures, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 provide a broader view for the allocation of 
Defense Budget in major EU-NATO countries compared to the United States.  It 
is obvious that the United States distributes its resources more evenly whereas 
EU countries, with the exception of the UK, have serious budget inequalities.  A 
qualified explanation is that  
Having different perceptions, concepts, and a different geography, 
it is almost natural that Europe spends less than America on 
defense and has different budgetary options.  Add to that the 
legacy of the Cold War, when the Europeans relied decisively on 
the Americans for the essence of their collective defense, thus 
leaving them key command-and-control and strategic capabilities, 
while providing manpower and land based assets that are of little 
use now.223 
 
Table 6 : Armed forces - Annual average strength
Tableau 6 : Forces armées - Effectif annuel moyen
Country  /  Pays 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003e
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Military  (thousand)   /    Militaires (millier)
  Belgium 108  107  106  47  42  42  41  42  42  
  Czech Republic 54  52  49  40  35  
  Denmark 33  29  31  27  27  24  22  22  22  
  France 572  560  548  502  420  394  366  355  356  
  Germany 490  495  545  352  331  319  306  295  285  
  Greece 186  201  201  213  204  205  202  209  203  
  Hungary 51  50  49  44  45  
  Italy 474  504  493  435  391  381  374  362  325  
  Luxembourg 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
  Netherlands 107  103  104  67  54  52  51  52  53  
  Poland 187  191  178  159  150  
  Portugal 88  102  87  78  71  68  68  69  68  
  Spain 356  314  263  210  155  144  151  135  135  
  United Kingdom 330  334  308  233  218  218  215  214  214  
  NATO - EU 2745  2751  2688  2166  |      2206  2141  2073  1999  1932   
Table 6.3. Armed Forces Annual Strength224 
 
                                            
223 Gustav Lindstrom (ed.), “Shift or Rift,” Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, Transatlantic Book 2003, October 2003, p. 78, available at 
http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/bk2003.pdf, accessed 15 March 2004. 
224 From http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-146e.htm, accessed 15 July 2004. 
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  United States 2,050 2,244 2,181 1,620 1,486 1,483 1,487 1,506 1,496
  NATO - EU 2,745 2,751 2,688 2,166 2,206 2,141 2,073 1,999 1,932
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003e
 
Figure 6.3. Military Forces Annual Strength225 
 
1.  Asymmetrical Structures 
The allocation of defense budget differs among EU member states, but 
remains at relatively high levels with respect to personnel.  European countries, 
with the exception of the UK, dedicate a range that varies from 48% up to 80% of 
personnel expenditures while leaving equipment expenditures at low levels. 
Refer to Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.  These figures clearly need reevaluation within 
the ESDP spirit.   
Equipments expenditures have been a weak link among NATO member 
states.  “Europeans have been schooled by history, up to and including the Cold 
War, to equate security with territorial integrity and to gauge threats in proportion 
to their geographic proximity”226.  With the absence of a real enemy, the need to 
acquire high tech weapons or to invest in military R&D programs has been a 
secondary issue for many decades.  However, recent high intensity conflicts 
proved that the U.S.-European military asymmetry is not an effective strategy for 
facing threats in the 21st century.  Today, the EU is keener than ever to become a 
guarantor force and strengthen global security.  Driven by multilateralism, which 
is in the foundation of Union, European States need to take advantage of their 
experience with NATO and promote an integrated command.    
                                            
225 Data retrieved from Ibid. 
226 Gustav Lindstrom, Ibid., p. 50. 
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On these grounds, cooperation with key NATO countries such as the 
United States could prove very helpful, especially when the sharing of military 













  Belgium 68.3  69.3  68.4  65.8  68.7  71.5  72.1  
  Czech Republic 46.9  42.8  46.0  45.5  48.6  
  Denmark 57.5  59.8  60.0  54.6  52.3  52.0  49.2  
  France 58.2  60.3  60.4  60.5  60.7  58.8  
  Germany 57.4  61.5  59.8  60.7  60.3  59.4  60.4  
  Greece 63.0  61.7  61.4  62.5  64.0  67.6  69.0  
  Hungary 46.7  48.7  47.9  49.3  48.7  
  Italy 63.6  71.8  74.0  71.4  72.3  74.0  73.7  
  Luxembourg 76.2  79.1  76.1  76.0  68.4  66.7  69.2  
  Netherlands 56.9  54.6  49.8  50.8  48.0  51.2  52.3  
  Poland 62.4  62.3  64.3  64.9  64.4  
  Portugal 77.3  80.8  83.2  81.8  80.8  84.1  80.2  
  Spain 64.9  66.5  66.0  63.9  63.4  62.4  61.7  
  United Kingdom 42.2  39.4  37.9  38.2  |          38.7  40.0  39.7  
  United States 39.3  39.0  38.1  37.7  36.2  36.1  35.3  




1999 2000 2001 2002 2003e
 
Figure 6.4. Personnel Expenditures227  
                                             
227 Data from Table: Total Defense Expenditure per NATO Country. Data retrieved from 











  Belgium 7.8  5.8  6.5  5.8  7.1  7.1  5.2  
  Czech Republic 16.3  22.5  20.3  17.5  21.0  
  Denmark 15.8  12.8  11.4  14.8  16.8  13.5  18.0  
  France 21.3  19.4  18.9  19.4  19.1  20.6  
  Germany 13.5  11.8  13.2  13.5  14.0  14.1  14.0  
  Greece 22.8  20.1  19.4  17.8  15.2  13.1  12.7  
  Hungary 21.0  12.4  10.5  11.1  10.2  
  Italy 16.3  12.9  11.7  14.3  10.3  12.4  12.7  
  Luxembourg 3.4  4.1  5.0  4.6  12.1  19.7  17.1  
  Netherlands 15.6  16.4  16.9  17.0  16.7  15.9  17.1  
  Poland 11.1  8.8  8.8  11.1  14.4  
  Portugal 5.7  5.5  4.2  6.4  5.3  4.1  7.3  
  Spain 12.4  12.8  11.5  12.9  12.7  12.8  11.8  
  United Kingdom 21.0  24.8  26.9  25.7  |          24.2  23.6  23.5  





1999 2000 2001 2002 2003e
 
Figure 6.5. Equipment Expenditures228 
 















  Belgium 20.4  21.0  21.4  26.5  20.4  18.8  20.0  
  Czech Republic 29.8  31.5  29.1  30.9  26.2  
  Denmark 23.3  25.2  26.6  29.3  28.2  30.8  30.0  
  France 16.4  15.9  16.2  15.6  16.0  15.8  
  Germany 23.9  21.9  21.9  20.9  21.3  22.1  21.1  
  Greece 12.2  16.2  17.2  17.9  19.4  18.1  17.0  
  Hungary 28.3  36.1  35.9  33.2  33.9  
  Italy 17.7  14.3  13.5  13.1  16.4  12.8  12.6  
  Luxembourg 9.4  12.0  12.1  14.5  11.6  11.0  11.4  
  Netherlands 22.1  24.7  29.6  27.8  31.1  29.2  26.8  
  Poland 25.1  27.1  24.6  22.3  18.6  
  Portugal 13.8  12.3  12.0  10.3  13.2  11.0  11.6  
  Spain 21.2  19.7  20.8  21.4  21.7  22.4  24.2  
  United Kingdom 30.5  30.5  30.1  31.7  |          36.1  35.6  35.9  
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Figure 6.6. Other Expenditures, (including R&D), as Part of the Total Defense 
Expenditure per NATO Country229 
 
2.    A Promising Example 
The UK, as the United States, has maintained a better balance over the 
years.  Not only has it managed the budget better, as demonstrated by Figure 
                                            
229 Ibid. 
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6.7, but also has explored NATO’s interoperability more than any other EU 
country. It is also obvious that while the UK has managed to differentiate, 
Germany and France followed parallel roads in military spending.     
 
 
Figure 6.7. Combination Figures230 
 
U.S. Major Robert L. McPeek231, who was assigned to the 14th Signal 
British Regiment, reveals from his experience how the British have advanced in 
teamwork and expertise.  
The 14th Signal Regiment is a leader in developing training and 
exercising opportunities with other NATO EW units. It has 
established and maintained relations with the U.S. 103d MI 
Battalion, the Royal Netherlands Army's 102d EW Company, the 
Royal Danish Army's EW Company LANDZEALAND, and the 
German Army's 320th Fernmelderegiment. U.S. MI personnel can 
                                            
230 Ibid. 
231 A deputy team chief at the U.S. Transportation Command's Joint Intelligence Center at 
Scott Air Force Base. Electronic Warfare British Style. Major Robert L. McPeek, available at 
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learn much from their experiences. We can reap great dividends by 
continuing and expanding multinational training opportunities with 
the NATO EW units like the 14th Signal Regiment.232   
He concludes with 
Knowledge is a very powerful tool when used correctly. As future 
military operations take on more of a multinational structure, it 
becomes imperative that we know more about the doctrine, tactics, 
and systems of our NATO Allies. Now is the time to learn and 
exchange vital information as it will be too late once we deploy in 
NATO or coalition operations.233   
C.   EU –NATO DIALOGUE   
In an effort to face the inevitable, (i.e., the development of ESDP) and 
unravel emerging arguments and misunderstandings, NATO in cooperation with 
the United States and EU-NATO countries, has initiated a dialogue that tries to 
establish boundaries and promotes cooperation.  Table 6.4 highlights the 
progress in this dialogue, starting with the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit in which 
an effort to satisfy European trends for autonomy by introducing the concept of 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the alliance, was initiated.   
                                            
232 Electronic Warfare British Style. Major Robert L. McPeek, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/tradoc/usaic/mipb/1996-1/mcpeek2.htm, accessed 6 July 2004. 
233 Ibid. 
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EU-NATO Dialogues and Documents  
Brussels… 1994 NATO Brussels Summit 
Berlin, 3 June 1996 Berlin Plus Agreement 
Washington DC, 24 April 1999, North Atlantic Council Summit 
Cologne, 3-4 June 1999 Cologne Summit 
Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999 EU Helsinki Council  
Santa Mara de Feira, 19-20 June 
2000 
European Council Summit 
Prague, November 2002 NATO Prague Summit  
Copenhagen, 12-13 December 
2002 
Copenhagen Summit 
Brussels, 18 June 2004 Brussels European Council Presidency 
Conclusions 
15 June 2004 10596/04 Report “European Defense: 
NATO/EU consultation, planning, and 
operations” 
Dromoland Castle, 26 June 2004 EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism
 
Table 6.4. EU-NATO Dialogue 
 
In Berlin, NATO identified “three objectives that would improve the 
Alliance capability to improve its roles”234.  The first was to “ensure the Alliance’s 
military effectiveness” the second was to “preserve the transatlantic link” and the 
third was “the development of the European Security and defense Identity within 
the Alliance”235.  In addition, the third objective was reinforced with the ability for 
“WEU236-led operations to use “separable but not separate NATO assets and 
capabilities”237.   
                                            
234 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996. Article 7. 
235 Ibid. 
236 “In 1997, with the signature of the Amsterdam Treaty, the condition of the Western 
European Union ( WEU) as an integral part of the EU was reaffirmed.” Alfredo Chamorro 
Chapinal, “The Security and Defense of Europe in the 21st Century-(NATO, WEU, OSCE), Final 
Report,” Madrid, May 2000, p. 48, available at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/chamorro.pdf, 
accessed 3 March 2004.   
237 Ibid.  
 114
Following the British-French Summit at St Malo238, 3-4 December 1998, it 
became clear that EU trends have matured towards developing more than a 
strong identity within NATO. The preannouncement of ESDP was more like an 
omen that was fulfilled. The reaction to St. Malo came with an article published in 
the London Financial Times, 7 December 1998.  In this article, the U.S. Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albraight “advised that the Europeans should try to skirt three 
potential dangers in relation with NATO: a) the strategic De-linking; b) the 
Duplication of force Structures; c) the Discrimination among interested European 
states.”239  
At the NATO Washington Summit, on 24 April 1999, the EU “won a 
number of key concessions from the US.  As the communiqué stated, NATO 
capabilities were to be put at the disposal of EU”240.  In addition, in the Cologne 
Summit, 3-4 June 1999, the EU announced that “the EU would try to give itself 
the means for direct military action within the spectrum of the Petersburg Tasks 
with or without the use of NATO assets, but has no intention to take under its 
responsibility the main missions of NATO”241.  On 18 October 1999, an important 
step was made towards cooperation, with the designation of Javier Solana, 
former Secretary General of NATO, “as High Representative for EU Common 
Foreign and Security matters, Secretary General of the European Council and at 
the same time Secretary General of the Western European Union242”.  The EU 
concluded that year, with the European Council at Helsinki 10-11 December 
1999, with the introduction of HG 2003, and the ESDP set its first objectives. 
The NATO EU relationship was once again at the forefront of the 
European Council Summit at Santa da Feira, 19-20 June 2000.  At the Summit, it 
                                            
238 Refer to Chapter II, p. 16. 
239 Alfredo Chamorro Chapinal, Ibid., p. 88. 
240 Giovanna Bono, European Security and Defense Policy: Theoretical Approaches, the 
Nice Summit and Hot Issues, p. 31, available at http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/esdp02.pdf, 
accessed 15 March 2004. 
241 Alfredo Chamorro Chapinal, Ibid., p. 90.  
241 Ibid.  
242 Ibid. 
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was announced that “four ad hoc working groups were to be set up on the 
capabilities goal and to prepare the ground for permanent arrangements between 
the two organizations”243.  Two years later, the Prague NATO Summit  
reiterated the value of the strategic partnership between NATO and 
the European Union.  Both are not just compatible but are indeed 
necessary partners in the security and defense field. Of course this 
requires a major European effort to develop the necessary military 
capabilities, both within NATO and through the EU’s HG which are 
mutually reinforcing processes244.  
That December at the Copenhagen Summit, “a significant turning point was 
made in the evolution of the fledging ESDP with a breakthrough on the use of 
NATO planning and military assets by the EU- so called Berlin Plus 
arrangements”245.  
The most recent developments in this issue came this summer at the 
Brussels European Council, 17-18 June 2004,  
The European Council welcomed the report (doc no 10596/04 of 15 
June 2004) by the Secretary-General/High Representative on the 
progress so far in taking forward the proposals in the document 
"European defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and 
operations", which was welcomed by the European Council in 
Brussels in December 2003. The European Council reaffirmed the 
importance of these measures coming into force as soon as 
possible and of the necessary resources being provided as a 
matter of priority. 
The European Council agreed to take forward work on the 
establishment of a civilian/military cell within the EU Military Staff, 
as set out in the abovementioned report, and agreed that the cell 
should begin its work at the latest by the end of this year. 
                                            
243 Giovanna Bono, Ibid., p. 33. 
244 Wesley K. Clark, Max Cleland, Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. and Gordon Smith, C. Richard 
Nelson, Robert L. Hutchings (Atlantic Council Policy Papers), Permanent Alliance? NATO's 
Prague Summit and Beyond. available at 
http://www.acus.org/Publications/policypapers/internationalsecurity/permanent Alliance.pdf, 
accessed 23 March 2004. 
245 Gerrard Quille, Making European Defense Work: Copenhagen, Berlin Plus and ECAP. 
Number 16, February 2003 European Security Review, available at http://www.isis-
europe.org/ftp/download/making%20eu%20defence%20work%20-%20esr%2015.pdf, accessed 24 May 
2004. 
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The European Council agreed to take forward work on the 
establishment of a small EU cell at SHAPE and NATO liaison 
arrangements with the EUMS, as set out in the abovementioned 
report, and invited the SG/HR to contact the NATO Secretary-
General with the aim of securing early agreement, entering into 
force by the end of this year246. 
The air of cooperation was reinforced by the EU-U.S. Declaration on 
Combating Terrorism at Dromoland Castle, on 26 June 2004. the EU and the 
Untied States affirmed that “will take forward work on counterterrorism, in 
keeping the following objectives, through dialogue and actions at all levels”: 
• We will work together to deepen the international consensus and 
enhance international efforts to combat terrorism. 
• We reaffirm our total commitment to prevent access by terrorists to 
financial and other economic resources. 
• We commit to working together to develop measures to maximise 
our capacities to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and 
prevent terrorist attacks. 
• We will seek to further protect the security of international transport 
and ensure effective systems of border control. 
• We will work together to develop further our capabilities to deal with 
the consequences of a terrorist attack. 
• We will work in close cooperation to diminish the underlying 
conditions that terrorists can seize to recruit and exploit to their 
advantage. 
• We will target our external relations actions towards priority Third 
Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to 
combating terrorism needs to be enhanced247.   
Today, the EU and NATO have established an agenda of cooperation in 
which the division of labor and sharing military capabilities play a dominant role. 
However, this agenda shows that European and U.S. forces could and should 
develop complementary rather than following parallel roads. Those who 
                                            
246 Council of European Union, Brussels European Council, 17 and 18 June 2004. 
Presidency Conclusions.  European Defense: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning & Operations, 
Paper 10679/04, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/81035.pdf, 
accessed 7 July 2004. 
247 EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism, Dromoland Castle, 26 June 2004, Paper 
10760/04 (Presse 205), available at 
http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/Summit0406/2004SumTerror.pdf, accessed 7 July 2004.  
 117
forecasted the dissolution of NATO through the development of ESDP have been 
disappointed, as the future shows that this relationship is far from ending.  
Moreover, the EU is still under integration process and as Figure 6.8 clearly 
illustrates, emphasis is on Economic development and internal structures.  The 
budget allowed for CFSP, in which ESDP falls, and is only 5% (i.e., external 
actions).  Defense spending is hard to increase, even at national levels, as EU 
public opinion for many years tends to view the EU as a potential global 
economic power and not as a military counter balance actor. Therefore, it is 
important to promote cooperation with NATO and share military capabilities.   
However, Europeans must undergo a transformation in defense spending. 
The defense budgets of key member states show that they need to spend better, 
not harder. More specifically, member states will have to: 
• reduce personnel and other related costs and reinvest the savings 
into equipment and R&D.  
• be committed to reshaping their military structures from large 
standing, conscript-based, mechanized armies to smaller 
deployable ones.  
• enhance cooperation in defense spending within the EU and 
NATO. As Klaus Naumann points out, “The EU itself should 
organize common procurement of assets such as aircraft for 
transport and air-to-air refueling.  These purchases should be made 
through a common EU fund to which all member-states would 
contribute.”248  Such European cooperation is already underway 
through the Airbus A400M transport aircraft program; however, it 
should be formalized and extended to other military capabilities as 
well.249   
• Lastly, EU member states will have to support the findings of the 
ECAP Panels financially and allow ECAP to address issues such 
as the long-term development of EW.    
The road ahead for European defense lies in transforming the European 
mentality in defense spending.  “A more capable European partner will provide 
                                            
248 Klaus Naumann, “Europe’s Military Ambitions,” Center for European Reform Bulletin, Iss. 
12, June/July 2000. 
249 Airbus Military, “A400M Programme,” Available at: http://www.airbusmilitary.com/home.html, 
accessed 4 June 2004. 
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flexibility and strength to the transatlantic security relationship”250. However, as 
the CFSP high representative, Javier Solana, stated in the Brussels informal 
meeting of Defense Ministers on April 2004:  
Success or failure is in your hands. I am convinced that the 
timelines can be met- but only if you, the Defense Ministers, put 
your weight behind the effort, and insist that self restrain is 
exercised all round, and that a spirit of compromise prevails251. 
 
















Figure 6.8. EU 2004 Budget Allocation Per Category252 
                                            
250 Edward G. Gunning, Jr., Ibid., p. 37. 
251 EU High Representative for the CFSP, at the Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers, 
Brussels, 5-6 April 2004, p. 3, available at 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/79815.pdf, accessed 7 July 2004. 
252 Data from: Directorate – General for Budget. European Commission. General Budget of 
the European Union for the Financial Year 2004. The Figures. SEC(2004)- EN. April 2004. 
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
The European Union entered the 21st century with the ambition to create a 
military defense capability to augment its already well-established political 
institutions.  The European Defense and Security Policy were launched in 1999 
as an indivisible part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU’s 
second pillar.  ESDP was created to “provide the Union with an operational 
capacity drawing on assets civil and military”253, in order to implement the 
Petersburg Tasks. The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate the 
perspectives for the development of ESDP and stress the need to consider EW a 
critical military and technological capability.  Thus, this thesis concluded:  
• EU is highly motivated in playing a significant role in the global 
arena and addressing unanimously and autonomously security 
threats.  
• The creation of ESDP along with the development of military and 
political structures such as the Political Security Committee (PSC), 
the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European 
Union Military Staff EUMS, confirms the Union’s determination to 
set and meet military objectives within the EU’s financial limits.  
• Headline Goals 2003, the EU’s first objectives within the framework 
of ESDP, addressed many military deficiencies.  The ECAP panels, 
designed to find solutions, are still under revisions.   
• Within the ECAP panels’ framework, EW, an important military 
asset especially where medium and high intensity conflicts are 
involved, is not addressed, although its role in Command and 
Control is crucial for any mission.   
• Despite the initial difficulties, EU has managed by 2003 to initiate 
threes missions: in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.  The results have been satisfactory but did not avow for the 
EU’s military autonomy.  The FYROM mission relied on the 
strategic partnership with NATO based on the Berlin-Plus 
agreement. 
                                            
253 Martin Ortega, Ibid., Chapter II. 
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• Headline Goals 2010, the EU’s latest objectives introduced in the 
Brussels European Council, 17-18 June 2004, address 
interoperability, flexibility, and mobility as key elements in the 
structure of the European Forces and introduce a new military elite 
force, the Battle Groups.       
• Although the EU stresses military autonomy, in the Conflict 
Cycle254, the gap in military assets and deficiencies related to 
interoperability do not provide the impetus for high intensity 
conflicts.  NATO has become an expert mainly due to assets 
shared by the U.S. forces, one of which is EW in this area. 
• EW remains a significant component of Command and Control 
(C2).  EW systems during training improve and substantiate the 
decision making-process while in the battlefields, when applied 
effectively, disarray an enemy commander from his/her forces. 
NATO has implemented the EW concept since 1966, establishing 
the Electronic Warfare Advisory Committee (NEWAC) that year. 
• In an effort to illustrate how modern EW tools could be used to 
provide a competitive advantage in the battlefield, the IMOM model 
was introduced and utilized to run in an imaginary scenario under 
the name “Save Atlantia 2008”.  The results clearly have shown the 
effectiveness of this program. 
• If EW tools are expensive to develop in the short term, then the 
very best thing for the EU is to cooperate within the NATO 
framework.  NATO has identified over the years the Union’s need to 
develop a strong identity within and out of the Alliance.  A dialogue 
has been initiated and both parties have realized that cooperation is 
the key ingredient for the success and the survival of the 
transatlantic relationship.   
• Defense ambitions in the EU do not correlate with Defense 
spending. Given the potential of the projects handled by the ECAP 
panels and the global threat environment, defense budgets ought to 
be increased. However, domestic social pressures in Europe, 
derived mainly by the integration process that coached EU citizens 
to care for economic prosperity and not for military superiority, it is 
unlikely that EU members will fulfill their defense ambitions with 
increased appropriations.   
• Transforming the defense spending, spend better not more, is a 
more promising strategy.  EU countries must restructure their 
militaries in order to reduce personnel costs and transfer those 
savings into equipment and R&D investments.  
                                            
254 Refer to Chapter III. 
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• Within the EU, the UK has managed to follow the US’s defense 
allocation norms.  It also has valuable experience concerning 
interoperability and has developed useful military assets, including 
EW tools.  Other European leading nations, such as France or 
Germany, with vital military industry, hold a lot of potential for the 
EU’s military advancement but their defense spending is a 
drawback.    
• Finally, it is concluded that EW plays a vital role in the development 
of ESDP.  It will provide RRF and the Battle Groups with an 
enormous advantage and the ability to increase effectiveness 
during operations.  Therefore, it is important for the time being to 
rely in NATO’s assets and cooperation. but in the long term. it is 
imperative for EU forces to rely on their own assets.   
The EU to date has shown a determination to implement an effective 
ESDP. However, as Nicolas Machiavelli stated 500 years ago, “a policy is not 
defined by its excellence but by its outcome”255.  The outcome of this effort is yet 
to be determined, but for the moment, it looks very promising. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are many recommendations the EU could follow in embracing EW 
as a military capability that needs to be developed in the long term.  Following 
NATO’s footsteps in this area is always a good starting point.  The following list 
emphases areas in which ESDP should pay initial attention.   
• Organize the EU’s RRF to plan and execute Electronic Warfare.  
• Develop a RRF Joint Operational Doctrine for Electronic Warfare.   
• Increase the Interoperability with NATO assets.   
• Establish an EW exercise planning policy and EW activities.   
• Examine the multinational aspects of EW.   
• Procure a certain number of available automated planning tools.    
• Increase the defense expenditures-limit the equipment 
procurement.   
• Last but not least, the EU‘s member-states contributions in EW 
personnel and assets should become a commitment.   
                                            
255 Robert Kaplan, “Warriors Politics,” Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, Random 
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APPENDIX A.  IMOM ROUTE REPORT/NPS/SUMMER 
2004/THESIS RESEARCH/“SAVE ATLANTIA 2008”/BY MAJ ILIAS 
PANAGOPOULOS 
UNCLASSIFIED/ 
SOJ Scenario = 
SOJ Site: ALQ-99(1) at 382252N 0214955E, 175.0 Degrees, 16000.0 Feet MSL 
Station NPS1             Ant Direction: 348.9 Degrees,    Ant Elevation: -10.0 Degrees 
Station NPS10_HIGH   Ant Direction: 35.8   Degrees,    Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS11_LOW   Ant Direction: 13.1   Degrees,    Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS12_HIGH  Ant Direction: 345.2  Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS13_LOW   Ant Direction: 338.0  Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS14             Ant Direction: 35.8    Degrees,    Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS14            Ant Direction: 348.1  Degrees,    Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS15            Ant Direction: 13.6   Degrees,     Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
  
SOJ Site: ALQ-99(2) at 371911N 0223457E, 206.0 Degrees, 15000.0 Feet MSL 
Station NPS16_HIGH   Ant Direction: 11.0   Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS18              Ant Direction: 26.2    Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS2_HIGH     Ant Direction: 350.5  Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS25_LOW   Ant Direction: 16.0    Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS23_LOW   Ant Direction: 352.1  Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS4_HIGH    Ant Direction: 24.7    Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS8_HIGH    Ant Direction: 358.0   Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees Station 
NPS9_LOW     Ant Direction: 115.6  Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
Station NPS4_HIGH    Ant Direction: 13.7    Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
SPJ: [No SPJ] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 1 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 260.6 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 400.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 1 at 383148N 0231603E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 2 at 383008N 0230328E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 3 at 382827N 0225053E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 4 at 382645N 0223819E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
Position Number: 5 at 382607N 0223339E       
Position Status: Search Radar Detected256 
       Contributing Site(s): 
        Eqp. Code: TPS-43EW (2)                  Site Status: Search Radar Detected 
 NATO Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR    ELNOT: Q0058    Function: EW 
          Location: 375945N 0215933E   Postion: 11 o'clock   Elevation: -0.4 degrees 
          Range: 38.3 NM   Terrain Masking Alt: 482 Feet AGL / 4016 Feet MSL 
                    -------------------------------------------- 
 Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 2 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 245.5 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 450.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 6 at 382156N 0222204E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
                                            
256 Explanation: In position 5, the aircraft is detected at the specific coordinates provided by 
the system. More information about the type of the threat are given (i.e., TPS-43), its location, its 
position, its elevation and its range in reference to the target, which has been detected flying at 
2000 ft. At the end, the system suggests a change in altitude, from 2000 ft to 482 ft Above 
Ground Level (AGL) or 4016 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL), in order to avoid detection. Also, in the 
above location, the jammer used was ineffective.  
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    Position Number: 7 at 381745N 0221030E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 8 at 381647N 0220751E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
           -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 3 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 229.6 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 480.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 9 at 381017N 0215811E       
 Position Status: Search Radar Detected 
      Contributing Site(s): 
      Eqp. Code: TPS-43EW (2)                  Site Status: Search Radar Detected 
 NATO Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR    ELNOT: Q0058    Function: EW 
          Location: 375945N 0215933E   Postion: 10 o'clock   Elevation: -0.9 degrees 
          Range: 10.8 NM   Terrain Masking Alt: 1052 Feet AGL / 4785 Feet MSL 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 10 at 380345N 0214832E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 11 at 375713N 0213856E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 12 at 375041N 0212921E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 13 at 374912N 0212711E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
  -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 4 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 151.1 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 480.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 14 at 374025N 0213318E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 15 at 373138N 0213922E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
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                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 16 at 372251N 0214525E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 17 at 371734N 0214903E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
           -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 5 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 133.0 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 480.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 18 at 371043N 0215813E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
   Position Number: 19 at 370351N 0220720E       
    Position Status: Weapon Lethal 
     Contributing Site(s): 
     Eqp. Code: GAINFUL (4)                  Site Status: Weapon Lethal 
     NATO Name: GAINFUL    ELNOT:     Function: AAA 
     Location: 370322N 0221055E   Postion: 11 o'clock   Elevation: -3.6 degrees 
       Range: 2.9 NM   Terrain Masking Alt257: 0 Feet AGL / 761 Feet MSL 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
  Position Number: 20 at 370209N 0220936E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 6 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 114.9 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 480.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 21 at 365755N 0222056E       
    Position Status: Search Radar Detected 
      Contributing Site(s): 
                                            
257 The suggested altitude is 0 ft. There is no way to avoid the threat in that position, simply 
by doing terrain masking. In this case, the user should either change the parameters of the 
jammer, or change the route at this point.   
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        Eqp. Code: CW (1)                  Site Status: Search Radar Detected 
        NATO Name: 6 BEAM EW    ELNOT: UN008    Function: EW 
        Location: 373815N 0222124E   Postion: 8 o'clock   Elevation: -1.6 degrees 
        Range: 39.5 NM   Terrain Masking Alt: 1119 Feet AGL / 7828 Feet MSL 
         
         Eqp. Code: TPS-43EW (2)                  Site Status: Search Radar Detected 
 NATO Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR    ELNOT: Q0058    Function: EW 
          Location: 375945N 0215933E   Postion: 8 o'clock   Elevation: -1.0 degrees 
          Range: 63.9 NM   Terrain Masking Alt: 1732 Feet AGL / 8441 Feet MSL 
 
       Eqp. Code: TPS-70EW (3)               Site Status: Search Radar Detected NATO Name: EW 
STACKED BEAM RADAR ultra low sidelobe     
ELNOT: Q0058    Function: EW 
          Location: 370927N 0222613E   Postion: 9 o'clock   Elevation: -4.4 degrees 
          Range: 13.0 NM   Terrain Masking Alt: 436 Feet AGL / 7145 Feet MSL 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 22 at 365339N 0223214E       
    Position Status: Search Radar Detected 
      Contributing Site(s): 
        Eqp. Code: TPS-70EW (3)                  Site Status: Search Radar Detected 
       NATO Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR ultra low sidelobe    \ 
       ELNOT: Q0058    Function: EW 
       Location: 370927N 0222613E   Postion: 8 o'clock   Elevation: -0.3 degrees 
       Range: 17.1 NM   Terrain Masking Alt: 1 Feet AGL / 1094 Feet MSL 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
Position Number: 23 at 364923N 0224332E      
Position Status: Search Radar Detected 
      Contributing Site(s): 
        Eqp. Code: TPS-70EW (3)                  Site Status: Search Radar Detected 
          NATO Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR ultra low sidelobe     
           ELNOT: Q0058    Function: EW 
          Location: 370927N 0222613E   Postion: 7 o'clock   Elevation: 0.1 degrees 
          Range: 24.8 NM   Terrain Masking Alt: 0 Feet AGL / 43 Feet MSL 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 24 at 364620N 0225134E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 7 
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    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 40.0 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 480.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 25 at 365400N 0225936E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 26 at 370140N 0230739E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 27 at 370919N 0231544E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 28 at 371658N 0232351E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 29 at 372436N 0233159E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 30 at 372855N 0233636E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                     -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 8 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 6.0 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 540.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 31 at 373853N 0233755E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 32 at 374852N 0233915E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 33 at 375850N 0234034E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 34 at 380501N 0234124E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 9 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 0.0 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 540.00 Knots 
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    Turnpoint Symbol: None 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 35 at 380526N 0234124E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      -------------------------------------------- 
  Route: Route ESDP Sample ID: 1, Leg Number: 10 
    Aircraft Altitude: 2000.0 Feet AGL 
    Aircraft Heading: 322.5 Degrees 
    Aircraft Velocity: 450.00 Knots 
    Turnpoint Symbol: Circle 
    Position Spacing: 10.0 NM 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 36 at 381322N 0233340E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 37 at 382119N 0232554E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 
    Position Number: 38 at 382914N 0231806E      Position Status: Terrain Masked 
                      ---------------------------------------- 









IMOM Route Report: Sorted by Site / NPS/ SUMMER 2004/ THESIS RESEARCH / “SAVE 
ATLANTIA 2008”/ by Maj Ilias Panagopoulos 
SOJ Scenario = 
  SOJ Site: ALQ-99(1) at 382252N 0214955E, 175.0 Degrees, 16000.0 Feet MSL 
  Station NPS1  Ant Direction: 348.9 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: -10.0 Degrees 
  Station NPS10_HIGH  Ant Direction: 35.8 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
  Station NPS11_LOW  Ant Direction: 13.1 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
  Station NPS12_HIGH  Ant Direction: 345.2 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
   Station NPS13_LOW  Ant Direction: 338.0 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
   Station NPS14  Ant Direction: 35.8 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
   Station NPS14  Ant Direction: 348.1 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
   Station NPS15  Ant Direction: 13.6 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
  SOJ Site: ALQ-99(2) at 371911N 0223457E, 206.0 Degrees, 15000.0 Feet MSL 
    Station NPS16_HIGH  Ant Direction: 11.0 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
    Station NPS18  Ant Direction: 26.2 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
   Station NPS2_HIGH  Ant Direction: 350.5 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
   Station NPS25_LOW  Ant Direction: 16.0 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
   Station NPS23_LOW  Ant Direction: 352.1 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
    Station NPS4_HIGH  Ant Direction: 24.7 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
    Station NPS8_HIGH  Ant Direction: 358.0 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
    Station NPS9_LOW  Ant Direction: 115.6 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 
    Station NPS4_HIGH  Ant Direction: 13.7 Degrees,   Ant Elevation: 0.0 Degrees 




Route Name(s): Route ESDP / RRF/ Peloponnesus/ Greece  
  
 US Number: 1 
  Eqp. Code: CW 
  Location: 373815N 0222124E 
  Nato Name: 6 BEAM EW 
  Function: EW 
  ELNOT: UN008 
                                                     
           Leg   Route   Detect          Altitude   Heading   
Velocity           Elevation      Range     Terrain Masking Alt 
Route Name   Num   Pt. #   Status                               Location              (ft)        
(deg)            (knots)   Position    (deg)     (NM)     (AGL / MSL) ft 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Route ESDP S     6    21   Search Radar Detected   365755N 0222056E  2000.0 AGL  114.9     
480.00    8 o'clock -1.6        39.5    1119 / 7828 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
US Number: 2 
  Eqp. Code: TPS-43EW 
  Location: 375945N 0215933E 
  Nato Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR 
  Function: EW 
ELNOT: Q0058                                                 
Leg   Route   Detect          Altitude   Heading   Velocity           
Elevation      Range     Terrain Masking Alt 
Route Name   Num   Pt. #   Status                               Location              (ft)        
(deg)            (knots)   Position    (deg)     (NM)     (AGL / MSL) ft 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Route ESDP S     1     5   Search Radar Detected   382607N 0223339E  2000.0 AGL  260.6     
400.00    11 o'cloc -0.4        38.3    482 / 4016 
Route ESDP S     3     9   Search Radar Detected   381017N 0215811E  2000.0 AGL  229.6     
480.00    10 o'cloc -0.9        10.8    1052 / 4785 
Route ESDP S     6    21   Search Radar Detected   365755N 0222056E  2000.0 AGL  114.9     




US Number: 3 
  Eqp. Code: TPS-70EW 
  Location: 370927N 0222613E 
  Nato Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR ultra low sidelobe 
  Function: EW 
  ELNOT: Q0058 
                                                     
Leg   Route   Detect         Altitude   Heading   Velocity           
Elevation      Range     Terrain Masking Alt 
Route Name   Num   Pt. #   Status                               Location              (ft)        
(deg)            (knots)   Position    (deg)     (NM)     (AGL / MSL) ft 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Route ESDP S     6    21   Search Radar Detected   365755N 0222056E  2000.0 AGL  114.9     
480.00    9 o'clock -4.4        13.0    436 / 7145 
Route ESDP S     6    22   Search Radar Detected   365339N 0223214E  2000.0 AGL  114.9     
480.00    8 o'clock -0.3        17.1    1 / 1094 
Route ESDP S     6    23   Search Radar Detected   364923N 0224332E  2000.0 AGL  114.9     
480.00    7 o'clock 0.1         24.8    0 / 43 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 US Number: 4 
  Eqp. Code: GAINFUL 
  Location: 370322N 0221055E 
  Nato Name: GAINFUL 
  Function: AAA 
  ELNOT: UN008 
                                                     
             Leg   Route   Detect          Altitude   Heading   
Velocity           Elevation      Range     Terrain Masking Alt 
Route Name   Num   Pt. #   Status                               Location              (ft)        
(deg)            (knots)   Position    (deg)     (NM)     (AGL / MSL) ft 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Route ESDP S     5    19   Weapon Lethal           370351N 0220720E  2000.0 AGL   
133.0     480.00    11 o'cloc -3.6        2.9     0 / 761 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
========================================================================= 
End of Route Summary. 
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APPENDIX B.  RADAR PARAMETRIC DATA FOR RADAR TPS-43 
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 
Caveat: 
Derived from: Classified by 
Declassification On: Declass Instructions 
Header Version: 1.00 
Component Name: TPS-43 EW 
Modified By: ILIAS PANAGOPOULOS 
Data Source: GR-EW 
Last Updated: 20 June 2004   21:45:00 GMT 
Comments: 
Unclassified (TPS-43) Data and parameters in order to determine its detection range 
against a 1 sqm target under clear weather conditions and with stand off jamming. The 
jammer parameters are given in another database. The rms sidelobe level is estimated 
at 10 dBi for this relative complex antenna system. Note that the system has a frequency 
agility that requires 200-MHz jammer bandwidth. Also the radar does not provide 
coherent integration that requires the Doppler bandwidth be set to the PRF value. 
Data Version: 1.00 
 
Equipment Code: TPS-43EW 
Nato Name: EW STACKED BEAM RADAR 
ELNOT: Q0058 
Function: EW 
Antenna Height (meters): 17.00 
Minimum Operating Frequency (GHz): 3.000 
Maximum Operating Frequency (GHz): 3.200 
Minimum Operating PRF (Hz): 250.00 
Maximum Operating PRF (Hz): 250.00 
Azimuth Beamwidth (deg): 1.10 
Backlobe Power: (dB down): 28.90 
Minimum Elevation Coverage Angle (deg): -8.40 
Maximum Elevation Coverage Angle (deg): 50.00 
Pulse Width (usec): 6.50 
Effective Noise Bandwidth (Hz): 100.00 
Pulse Compression Gain (dB): 4.50 
Receiver Loss (dB): 12.00 
Calculated One Square Meter Detection Range (Km): 2912.65 
Documented One Square Meter Detection Range (Km): 102.00 
Maximum Processing Range (Km): 220.00 
 
Beams: 
 Beam #1 
Pattern: Stacked 
Frequency (GHz): 3.000 
Elevation Boresight (deg): 6.00 
Elevation Beam Width (deg): 2.60 
Transmitter Gain (dB): 36.00 
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Receiver Gain (dB): 40.00 
Power (KW): 4000.0000 
PRF (Hz): 250.00 
Effective Number of Pulses: 20.00 
S/N With Integration Case 1 (dB): 2.45 
S/N With Integration Case 2 (dB): -0.13 
Noise Figure (dB): 4.50 
Polarization: Horizontal 
 
Azimuth Side Lobes: 
   Azimuth Side Lobe #1  
Boresight (deg from main): 2.6 
Width (deg): 2.5 
Power (dB down): 25.0 
Elevation Side Lobes: 
Azimuth Lobe #1 
Boresight (deg from main): 3.3 
Width (deg): 1.6 
Power (dB down): 17.0 
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APPENDIX C.  WEAPON PARAMETRIC DATA 
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 
Caveat: 
Derived from: Classified by 
Declassification On: Declass Instructions 
Header Version: 1.00 
Component Name: GAINFUL 
Modified By: ILIAS PANAGOPOULOS 
Data Source: HAF-NPS 
Last Updated: 20 Apr 2004   21:01:20 GMT 
Comments: 
Surface to Air Tactical guided missile 
Target Acquisition: Visual/Radar 
Missile Guidance: Radio Command / Semi ACTIVE homming 
Missile CCM: - 
Data Version: 1.10 
 
Equipment Code: GAINFUL 
Nato Name: GAINFUL 
Label: SA-6 
Type: AAA 
Minimum AGL Altitude (feet): 90.0 
Maximum AGL Altitude (feet): 60000.0 
Minimum Effective Range (nm): 2.20 
Maximum Effective Range (nm): 16.00 




Jamming Technique Parametric Data:  
 
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 
Caveat: TEST DATA 
Derived from: Classified by 
Declassification On: Declass Instructions 
Header Version: 1.00 
Component Name: ALQ-91 
Modified By: ILIAS PANAGOPOULOS 
Data Source: NPS 
Last Updated: 16 Apr 2004   19:09:26 GMT 
Comments: 
Jamming Techniques Dta 
Data Version: 1.10 
 
Jamming Technique Name: null 
Jamming Modes: 
 
 Jamming Mode: NOISE 
 Sum Jamming: Yes 
Max Osc. Per Station: 4 
 
 
 Jamming Mode: COMFUSION 
 Sum Jamming: Yes 
Max Osc. Per Station: 4 
 
Jamming Mode: DECEPTION 
 Sum Jamming: Yes 
Max Osc. Per Station: 1 
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